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PREFACE 
 
The contents of this book are based on from materials I developed 
to teach a course called “Animals and Ethics” for the Humane 
Society of the United States’ Humane Society University from 2008-
2015. Some of the course’s description and goals are on the next 
pages. I hope these materials will find use in courses and 
discussion groups and be helpful for individual readers. The 
Humane Society University is no longer operating, but I am 
grateful to them for the opportunity to develop and teach this 
course and for the students who took part in the course.  
This book can serve as a brief guide and companion to some 
important in-print books on animals and ethics by Peter Singer 
(Animal Liberation, among others), Tom Regan (Empty Cages, 
among others) and Mark Rowlands (Animals Like Us, among 
others) and others. This book refers to many sources, both in print 
and online. For online sources, I usually – but not always – 
provide a URL for the source; if not, I write (Google) after the 
source. If the given URL does not work, readers should Google 
the author and title (or the title in quotes) to try to find the source. 
Since URLs come and go and uploaded materials change, perhaps 
this will yield the reading. Also, who knows what other interesting 
sources and discussion on these issues that Google might turn up! 
Please feel free to contact me with any reactions to these 
materials and with any suggestions or questions. I look forward to 
hearing from you! 
 
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D. 
Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA USA 
Nathan.Nobis@Gmail.com   
www.NathanNobis.com  
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ABOUT THIS BOOK 
 
This book provides an overview of the current debates about the 
nature and extent of our moral obligations to animals. Which, if 
any, uses of animals are morally wrong, which are morally 
permissible (i.e., not wrong) and why? What, if any, moral 
obligations do we, individually and as a society (and a global 
community), have towards animals and why? How should animals 
be treated? Why? 
We will explore the most influential and most developed answers 
to these questions – given by philosophers, scientists, and animal 
advocates and their critics – to try to determine which positions 
are supported by the best moral reasons. Topics include:  
 
• general theories of ethics and their implications for 
animals,  
• moral argument analysis,  
• general theories of our moral relations to animals,  
• animal minds, and  
• the uses of animals for food, clothing, experimentation, 
entertainment, hunting, as companions or pets, and other 
purposes. 
 
The book offers discussion questions and paper assignments to 
encourage readers to develop positions on theoretical and practice 
issues concerning ethics and animals, give reasons for their 
support, and respond to possible objections and criticisms.  
This book is organized around an initial presentation of three 
of the most influential methods of moral thinking for human to 
human interactions. We then see how these ethical theories have 
been extended to apply to human to animal interactions, i.e., how 
humans ought to treat non-human animals.  
These perspectives are: 
 
• a demand for equality or equal moral consideration of interests 
(developed by Peter Singer); 
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• a demand for respect of the moral right to respectful treatment 
(developed by Tom Regan); and 
• a demand that moral decisions be made fairly and impartially 
and the use of a novel thought experiment designed to 
ensure this (developed by Mark Rowlands, following John 
Rawls).  
 
We will see what these moral theories imply for the general “moral 
status” of various kinds of animals and for particular uses of 
animals, e.g., for food, fashion, experimentation, entertainment, 
and other purposes. We attempt to evaluate these theories as true 
or false, well-supported or not and the arguments based on them 
as sound or unsound. 
We will also survey general moral theories that imply that we 
have few if any, moral obligations to animals and other arguments 
given in defense of various uses of animals. One challenge for 
learning about ethics and animals is that there are fewer defenses 
of harmful animal use developed by professional ethicists than critiques 
of animal use. Since the common view is that animal use does not 
raise serious moral issues, perhaps people often do not see much 
need to defend that assumption. Nevertheless, we will find 
materials that provide the strongest and most common defenses of 
various uses of animals so that we might evaluate the arguments in 
favor of these positions.  
 
PRIMARY READINGS 
 
The theories from Singer, Regan and Rowlands are developed in 
these books, and others: 
 
1. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 3rd Edition (Ecco 2002, 
1990, 1975). http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger/  
 
A classic, the book that started the modern animal 
protection movement.  
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2. Tom Regan, Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). http://tomregan-
animalrights.com  
 
A descendent of a classic, Tom Regan’s 1983 The Case for 
Animal Rights. In addition to an argument that many 
animals possess moral rights, the book tells the stories of 
animal advocates’ personal development (including 
Regan’s) and discusses the influence of the media and 
animal use industries have in shaping how people often 
address ethics and animals. The best general introduction 
to ethics & animals issues.  
 
3. Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (Verso, 2002).  
 
According to PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals) some people think Animals Like Us is the next 
Animal Liberation. Rowlands has other, more recent books 
on animals and ethics also, e.g., Animal Rights: All That 
Matters and others.  
 
Good discussion and commentary are found in these books, 
which are recommend reading: 
 
4. Lori Gruen, Ethics and Animals: An Introduction (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011):  http://www.lorigruen.com/  
 
This book provides both original arguments, beyond those 
from the authors above, and insights and reviews and 
comments on many of the theories from Singer and Regan. 
 
5. Angus Taylor, Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the 
Philosophical Debate, 3rd edition (Broadview 2009).  A nice 
overview of the literature. (On Amazon.) 
 
This is a good “secondary source” that gives an overview 
of the many philosophical positions on theoretical and 
practical issues concerning ethics and animals. 
viii 
 
  
 
LEARNING OUTCOMES 
 
At the conclusion of this book, readers will be able to: 
 
• understand basic, fundamental concepts, theories, and 
methods of reasoning from general ethics  
• apply these ethical concepts to specific moral issues 
concerning animals; 
• demonstrate stronger general skills in analyzing logic, 
critical thinking, and moral argument analysis; 
• identify and evaluate arguments defending or opposing 
particular uses of animals, and theoretical claims about our 
obligations toward animals; 
• understand the most influential moral arguments and 
positions given in defense of animals and for greater 
animal protection, these arguments’ similarities and 
differences, the most common and influential objections 
that are raised against them, and how these arguments’ 
advocates respond in defense of their positions; 
• understand the most influential moral arguments and 
positions given in defense of animal use and against 
increased animal protection, these arguments’ differences, 
the most common and influential objections that are raised 
against them and how these arguments’ advocates might 
respond in defense of their positions; 
• understand and be able to evaluate claims about the 
morally-relevant empirical information needed to make 
informed moral judgments on ethics and animals issues; 
• understand what implications the various theories of ethics 
have for practical, concrete uses of animals, e.g., for food, 
for clothing, for experimentation, for entertainment, etc., 
as well as stronger skills at identifying and evaluating other 
reasons given for and against such uses of animals; 
• more deeply develop their own views on the nature of our 
obligations to animals and be abler to provide moral 
defenses of their views and respond to critical objections 
and questions.  
ix 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, LOGIC 
AND ETHICS & ANIMALS 
 
These chapters are intended to provide background to the 
readings, highlight important issues in the readings, introduce 
readings, and raise questions.  This first chapter is longer than the 
rest.  
 
Overview 
 
Discussions of animal ethics are more fruitful when approached 
after an exposure to general thinking about ethics and methods of 
moral argument analysis. Theories of animal ethics are typically 
extensions or modifications of theories developed for addressing 
more familiar (and often less controversial) questions about 
human-to-human ethics. Therefore, it is important to be familiar 
with these theories and methods. These online readings will 
introduce readers to the more influential moral theories and 
methods of moral argument analysis, and we will read the 
introductions to our texts on animal ethics. 
 
Readings 
 
James Pryor (NYU Philosophy), Guidelines on Reading 
Philosophy: 
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html   
 
Readings on argument analysis:  
 
Since arguments for and against various uses of animals often 
have as a premise a moral principle derived from an ethical theory, 
we will first learn some basic concepts about arguments. We 
will then survey some ethical theories, some arguments in 
favor of some of them (i.e., reasons given to think that a 
theory is true), and some arguments against some of them 
(i.e., reasons given to think that a theory is false).  
 
James Rachels, “Some Basic Points About Arguments,” from 
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his The Right Thing To Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy, 4th 
Ed. (McGraw Hill, 2007) (Google). 
 
James Pryor, “What Is an Argument?” 
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/argument.html  
 
Readings that introduce common moral theories (and critique 
some of them):  
 
• James Rachels, “A Short Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy,” from The Right Thing To Do (Google) 
• Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” from Tom 
Regan and Peter Singer, eds., In Defense of Animals 
(Blackwell, 1985): 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/regancase_f
or_animal_rights.pdf ; also available here: 
http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-
m/regan03.htm  
  
Our texts’ short prefaces and introductions: 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – Preface to the 1975 Edition 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – Preface to the 1990 Edition 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – Preface to the 2002 Edition   
 
EMPTY CAGES – FORWARD by Jeffrey Moussaieff 
Masson 
EMPTY CAGES – PROLOGUE: The Cat  
EMPTY CAGES – EPILOGUE: The Cat  
 
EMPTY CAGES – PART I NORMAN ROCKWELL 
AMERICANS  
EMPTY CAGES – 1. Who Are You Animal Rights 
Advocates Anyway?  
EMPTY CAGES – 2. How Did You Get That Way?   
 
Part I of Empty Cages discusses the influence the media and 
special interest politics have on how ethics & animals issues 
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are typically approached. It also explains some different routes 
people might take to becoming involved in animal issues and 
Regan’s tells the personal story of how he became an Animal 
Rights Advocate. This part of the book is, strictly speaking, 
not philosophy or ethics (but it surely relevant to ethics) and 
is an interesting, easy read.  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Editor’s Introduction   
ANIMALS LIKE US – Introduction   
 
Optional: Gruen, preface, and introductory matter.  
 
Readers should sign up for these online email lists to keep up 
on major media coverage of issues concerning ethics and 
animals: 
 
Dawnwatch News Service: http://dawnwatch.com  
Vegan Outreach’s  E-Newsletter: 
http://www.veganoutreach.org/enewsletter/index.html  
 
Some of the links on the readings might be incorrect. Please 
Google the title and you will likely find the file online.  
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Moral Questions 
 
In this book we will attempt to reasonably answer moral or ethical 
questions concerning the treatment and use of animals.1 Some of 
these questions are general2, e.g.: 
 
• Morally, how should we treat animals?   
• Which uses of animals, if any, are morally permissible, and 
which are morally wrong?   
• Do we have any moral obligations toward any animals? 
What is the extent of these obligations? Why do we have 
these obligations (if we do)? What is it about (various kinds 
of) animals that make them such that how we treat them 
matters morally? 
• Are there different obligations toward different animals? 
Might certain uses of some animals be morally permissible, 
whereas using other animals in similar ways would be 
wrong? (E.g., might some experiments be wrong if done 
on chimpanzees, whereas morally permissible, or perhaps 
“less wrong,” if done on mice?  
• Morally, should we be concerned only with certain kinds of 
animals, e.g., those who are conscious and have feelings? 
What about insects? What about unicellular organisms? On 
what basis do we decide? 
 
 
                                               
 
1 The terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ will be used synonymously 
throughout this course.  
2 These questions might be described as being about the “moral 
status” of animals. I will not use this term however, since it is better 
to just ask straightforward questions about whether some treatment 
or use is morally permissible or not (and why), whether some treating 
some being (e.g., some animal) one way would be better or worse 
than treating another being (e.g., some human being) in a similar way, 
and so on.   
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Other questions deal with specific uses of animals, e.g.: 
 
• Is it morally permissible to trap and skin animals for their 
fur in our society, where alternatives to fur coats are readily 
available? If we lived somewhere where there were no such 
“alternative” means to keep warm would that make a 
difference to the morality of using animals for their fur? 
• Is it morally permissible to raise and kill animals to eat 
them in our society, where nutritious alternatives to animal 
foods are readily available? If we were somewhere where 
there were inadequate non-animal foods would that make a 
difference to the morality of using animals for food? 
• If it could be known, with certainty, that some experiments 
on animals would save the lives of many human beings (or 
even just one?), would these experiments be morally 
permissible? If there was only a slight chance that these 
experiments would lead to such benefits, or no chance, 
would this make a difference to the morality of these 
experiments? 
 
While everyone has answers to these questions, we are not 
interested in anyone’s mere “opinions” or “feelings” about how 
they should be answered. We want to find out which answers are 
backed by the best moral reasons or strongest moral arguments, i.e., the 
arguments that we have the strongest reasons to believe are sound. 
We want to know why we should accept some answers to these 
questions and reject others. To do this we will attempt to improve 
out skills at reasoning morally.1  
                                               
 
1 We will challenge our own answers to questions like these above 
and arguments in favor of them by considering contrary answers to 
these questions (i.e., answers that contradict your, and perhaps our, 
answers). If we carefully identify evaluate the arguments given by 
people we disagree with, we may find that their arguments are 
stronger than our own and so we should change our minds! Another 
possibility is that their beliefs about how animals should be treated 
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What the Question Is Not: Not “Morally Right,” but Morally 
Permissible and/or Morally Obligatory 
 
One might think that the core questions in animal ethics are 
whether various uses of animals are morally right or morally wrong. 
This is not quite correct. Effective moral reasoning requires the 
clear and precise uses of words. Thus, when a word is ambiguous 
(i.e., has more than one meaning), we must identify these 
meanings and make it clear what meaning we are using. That way 
everyone knows what exact thought we have in mind when we 
make claims using that word: we’re on the same page and can 
communicate effectively. And we can think about whether what 
we are saying is true or false and supported (or supportable) by 
reasons and evidence or not.  
 This applies to the use of the word ‘right,’ as in morally right 
because the word is ambiguous. Examples show this. Suppose you 
saved a drowning baby by pulling her out of the bathtub. This was 
easy for you, not risky, and had you not been there the baby surely 
would have drowned. If someone says, “Your saving that baby 
was morally right,” this person probably means to say that your 
saving that baby, in these circumstances, was morally obligatory, 
morally required, or a moral duty: if you had not saved the baby, you 
                                                                                                         
 
should change and, perhaps, their behaviors toward animals should 
change also.  Although change – in belief, attitude, feeling, action and 
policy – is a focus of this course, it is not about persuasion in the way 
that a course on advertising, marking, propaganda, and public / 
media relations might be. It is about persuasion, however, in that we 
are trying to identify which views people should persuaded to accept, 
if we wish to think critically and carefully about what we morally 
ought to do. If we are capable of such critical moral thinking (and, if 
so, how this is done) will be discussed below and in the readings on 
logic and argument analysis and practiced throughout the course. 
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would have done something wrong or morally impermissible.1  
 Consider another example. Although you are a person of average 
income, you send $1000 a month to famine relief organizations to 
help starving children. Someone says, “Your making these 
donations is morally right.” Here this person probably does not 
mean to say your making these donations are morally obligatory, 
morally required, or a moral duty. Unlike the bathtub case, the 
common (but perhaps mistaken2) view is that your not donating 
would not be wrong or morally impermissible. So, this person 
probably means to by saying, at least, that what you do is morally 
permissible, i.e., not wrong or not morally impermissible. She might 
also mean that it is not merely permissible, but more positively 
good beyond that, but definitely not morally obligatory.  
 With these distinctions in mind, we can stop using an ambiguous 
word – “morally right” – and instead use these more precise terms 
categories for morally evaluating actions: 
 
1. morally permissible: morally OK; not morally wrong; not 
morally impermissible; “OK to do”; 
2. morally obligatory: morally required; a moral duty; 
impermissible to not do it; wrong to not do it; “gotta do 
it”; 
3. morally impermissible: morally wrong; not permissible; 
obligatory to not do it; a duty to not do it.  
 
We might also add a category “between” the permissible and the 
                                               
 
1 Of course, if story is that you didn’t save the baby because you can’t 
because you are paralyzed, or because you were already maxed-out 
saving 12 other drowning babies, then you weren’t obligated to save 
this baby. 
2 Perhaps, however, “common sense” is mistaken and affluent people 
are morally obligated to make donations like these. For arguments for 
this conclusion, see (among other sources) Peter Singer’s “Famine, 
Affluence and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 
(Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 (Google) and his “The Singer Solution to 
World Poverty,” New York Times, 1999 (Google). 
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obligatory for actions that are positively good, virtuous or 
admirable, and thereby morally permissible, but not obligatory: 
e.g., some argue that vegetarianism is in that category, and if this is 
correct then arguments for the conclusion that vegetarianism is 
morally obligatory are unsound. This category might be described 
as the “supererogatory,” meaning beyond the call of duty or what’s 
morally required. 
 Thus, the core questions in ethics and animals are what moral 
categories specific uses of animals fall into – morally permissible, 
morally obligatory, or morally impermissible or wrong – and, most 
importantly, why. Again, the reasons given for why we should think, 
e.g., that some use is permissible and another use is wrong, or 
whatever conclusions anyone advocates, are our main interest.  
 
What the Questions Also Is Not: Not (Necessarily) Animal 
“Rights”  
 
A second possible interpretation of the core questions of animal 
ethics is that they are about whether animals have “rights.” On this 
view, to ask whether various uses of animals are morally 
permissible or not is just to ask whether animals have rights or not. 
It is very common for these two notions to be equated, but they 
shouldn’t be, for a variety of reasons.  
 
Legal Rights: Not the Issue 
 
First, the term ‘rights’ is multiply ambiguous. One kind of rights 
are legal rights. Legal rights are such that, in theory, if they are 
violated, somebody can be punished by the criminal system. Legal 
rights are “man-made” and vary by time and location: the legal 
rights women have in the US differ from the legal rights women 
have in, e.g., Afghanistan. To figure out what legal rights animals 
have is often easy: just check the law books. There you would find 
that there are few laws that protect animals from harm: they have 
few legal rights. 
  Legal rights are not of much interest to us as ethicists, however, 
because what’s legally permitted need not be morally permissible: 
e.g., slaveholding in the US South hundreds of years ago was legal 
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yet immoral; and what’s legally required may not be morally 
permissible: e.g., the legal requirement that drugs be “tested” on 
animals might be an immoral requirement. Although legal 
standards can be sometimes seen as a highly imperfect expression 
of a society’s general views on what’s moral and immoral, we will 
generally not discuss the law beyond our readings’ occasionally 
observations that animals have few legal rights. 
 
Moral Rights: Not Necessarily the Issue 
 
A second possible kind of rights are moral rights. What are moral 
rights? Later Chapters will address some common 
misunderstandings and resulting confusions about moral rights, 
but the most important reason to not equate the questions of what 
uses of animals are permissible and whether animals have moral 
rights is this: although this might sound odd to some people, it’s 
possible that many uses of animals are wrong even though animals 
have no moral rights. Various uses of animals might be wrong for 
other moral reasons besides their having rights, so even if animals have 
no rights, it doesn’t immediately follow that harmful animal use is morally 
permissible. Equating the two issues conceals this possibility.  
 Again, the core questions in ethics and animals are what moral 
categories we should think specific uses of animals fall into – 
morally permissible, morally obligatory, or morally 
impermissible/wrong – and the reasons why we should think this. 
Thinking in terms of moral rights can make the issues more 
confusing than they have to be. 
 
Some Basic Concepts about Arguments: Introduction to 
Logic   
 
To attempt to try to figure out which moral views about animals 
are correct, we will try to find out which views are supported by 
the best reasons. To do this, will identify and evaluate arguments. 
The James Rachels (“Some Basic Points About Arguments” 
(Google) and James Pryor (at 
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/index.html) readings 
give excellent overviews of what arguments are and what makes 
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arguments good and bad.  
 An argument is a conclusion that is supported by premises. The 
premises should lead to the conclusion, forming a “chain” of 
reasoning: this makes the argument “logically valid” (a technical 
term with a precise meaning that differs from how non-
philosophers often might use the term). In a valid argument, since 
the premises lead to the conclusion (and this chain of reasoning is 
clearly identifiable), if the premises are true, then the conclusion 
must be true as well. When an argument is valid and the premises 
are true, then the argument is sound (and the conclusion is 
thereby true, given the definition of “valid” and the fact that the 
premises are true). If the argument is valid and, with good reasons, 
you think the premises are true, then you should think the 
argument is sound. We want to find sound arguments and reject 
unsound ones. 
 Our main concern is finding the arguments, understanding what 
exact conclusion(s) is being defended and what exact premises are 
given in its favor. We have to figure out whether the premises lead 
to the conclusion, i.e., is valid, or if we can “tweak” the argument 
by adding premises to make it valid. We then try to figure out if it 
is sound. Here are three rules for carefully identifying arguments: 
 
1. Make the stated conclusion(s) and premise(s) precise in 
quantity: is something said to be true (or false) of all things 
(or people, or animals, etc.), or just some of them (and if so, 
which ones?)? 
2. Clarify the intended meaning(s) of unclear or ambiguous 
words in conclusions or premises. 
3. State (any) assumed premises so that the complete pattern of 
reasoning in an argument is displayed and it is clear how 
the stated premise(s) logically leads to the conclusion.  
 
Other important logical tools are that of necessary condition(s), 
sufficient condition(s), necessary and sufficient condition(s), and 
counterexamples. (See Pryor especially). The importance of these 
concepts for animal ethics will be apparent as we work through 
the issues.  
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Moral Principles as Premises: Introduction to Ethics  
 
Moral arguments often have a moral principle as a premise. We will 
attempt to figure out if these premises are true. Moral principles 
often assert that an action having some feature(s) is a sufficient 
condition(s) for that action being morally wrong, permissible, or 
whatever. E.g., here are two possible moral principles: 
 
A.  If an action causes pain, then that action is morally wrong. 
B.  If an action benefits someone and harms nobody, then that 
action is morally permissible.  
 
(Can principle A can be refuted, i.e., shown false, by 
counterexamples, an exception to the proposed rule? Is principle B 
true? How would we try to figure that out?). Moral principles 
might also claim that an action having some feature(s) is a necessary 
condition for that action being morally wrong, permissible, or 
whatever, e.g.: 
 
C. A being has a “right to not suffer needlessly” only if that 
being is capable of reasoning morally.  
 
(Can principle C be refuted, i.e., shown false, by 
counterexamples?).  
 
Moral principles are often justified by appeal to moral or ethical 
theories. A moral theory attempts to answer these kinds of 
questions: 
 
• What makes morally right actions right and wrong actions 
wrong? (Or, what makes permissible acts permissible, 
obligatory actions obligatory, etc.?)? What is it about actions 
that give them the moral status (permissible, obligatory, 
etc.) that they have? 
• What’s the basic, fundamental, essential difference(s) 
between permissible and impermissible actions? What 
features of actions mark that divide? 
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• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an action 
being permissible, obligatory, etc.? 
 
Before looking at influential theories developed and refined by 
philosophers, it is useful to start by developing your own moral 
theory (or theories). Here is one method to do that: 
 
Make a chart with three columns. In the left column, make a 
long list of actions (and we can use character traits too, if 
you’d like) that you think most people would think are 
obviously wrong or bad. In the right column, make a long list of 
actions or character traits that you think most people would 
think are obviously morally permissible, obligatory or otherwise good. In 
the middle, list any actions that come to mind but don’t fall 
into either category. Share your list with others to compare, 
change, revise, etc.1 
 
Now ask, what is it about the wrong actions on your list that makes 
them wrong? Why are they on the “wrong” list? What is it about 
the right/good actions that make them right or good? Why do they 
belong on that list? What moral hypotheses best explains this? 
Your answers here could result in your revising your initial 
judgments if you see that some emerging moral principles are 
inconsistent with any initial judgment.  
   
A complementary approach is this: 
 
Describe how animals are treated in, e.g., the food industry, 
the fur industry, in experimentation, etc. Would treating (any?) 
human beings in these ways be morally permissible, or would 
                                               
 
1 From Christina Hoff-Sommers’ “Teaching The Virtues” (Google): 
“It is wrong to mistreat a child, to humiliate someone, to torment an 
animal. To think only of yourself, to steal, to lie, to break promises. 
Torturing a child. Starving someone to death. Humiliating an invalid 
in a nursing home. On the positive side: it is right to be considerate 
and respectful of others, to be charitable and generous.” 
14 
 
 
this be wrong? What moral hypotheses – about what makes 
wrong actions wrong – best explain why this is so, e.g., why it 
would be wrong to treat humans in these ways? 
 
These exercises might result in you developing basic theories that 
are similar to many influential moral theories that have been 
developed over the last few centuries, if not longer. Thinking for 
yourself can lead to many of the same moral insights many of the 
philosophical “greats” have had.  
 James Rachels, in “A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy” 
(Google) and Tom Regan (“The Case for Animal Rights” article, 
not book; Google) discuss the (arguably) more plausible moral 
theories last after they discuss and sometimes argue against the 
(arguably) inferior theories. Here are the theories they discuss: 
 
• Relativism & Moral Skepticism (Rachels, “Short 
Introduction” 2-3; Rachels “Basic Points About 
Arguments,” 22-27) 
o Rachels argues relativism and skepticism are false.  
• Divine Command Theory (Rachels “Short Introduction” 
3-5) 
o Rachels argues the divine command theory is false 
and even that religious believers should not accept 
it. (See below on religion and ethics).  
• Virtue Theory (Rachels, “Short Introduction” 5-6); 
“Cruelty-Kindness” (Regan, 217) 
o Regan argues that a kind of virtue theory, which he 
calls the cruelty-kindness view, is mistaken.  
• Natural Law (Rachels, “Short Introduction” 6-8). Not a 
very popular theory any more outside of some Catholic 
contexts.  
• Contractarianism / the Social Contract (Rachels “Short 
Introduction” 8-10); Regan (214-216). (Regan also 
discusses Rawls’ improved version of contractarianism; 
Mark Rowlands modifies this theory to argue in defense of 
animals.) 
o Regan argues that contractarianisms are false.   
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• Utilitarianism (Rachels “Short Introduction” 11-14; 
Regan 217-220) 
o Regan argues that utilitarianism is false.   
• Immanuel Kant’s Ethics (“Short Introduction” 17-19); 
“The Rights View” (Regan 220-223), which is developed 
out of a modification of Kant’s 2nd Categorical Imperative; 
Regan has a broader view of who should be treated as 
“ends in themselves.”  
 
Here are two categories for ethical theories: 
 
• Altruistic Ethical Theories (Rachels “Short 
Introduction” 10-11): a broad category of ethical theories; 
they contrast with “egoistic” theories where the only 
intrinsic moral concern is for yourself and how your 
actions affect your own interest.  
• Ethical Theories that Require Impartiality (Rachels 
“Short Introduction” 14-16): a broad category of ethical 
theories; contrasts with “partialist” theories that allow 
special preference to family and friends. 
 
Animal advocates typically argue that the moral theory(s) that best 
explain how we ought to treat human beings (especially vulnerable 
human beings: the very young and very old) have positive 
implications for animals. Whether their arguments are sound, we 
shall see.  
 
Religion and Ethics: A Brief Comment 
 
Ethical issues are sometimes addressed in the context of religion; 
indeed, it’s often assumed that the two are inseparable. For this 
book, we will reject this assumption, largely for the reasons that 
Rachels presents, following Socrates. Their reasoning is this:  
 
If some religious text, authority, or even God makes a moral 
judgment (e.g., about whether some use of animals is morally 
permissible or not, or any other moral topic), then either there 
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are reasons that justify that judgment or not. If there are no 
reasons supporting that judgment, then it is arbitrary and 
should not be accepted. If there are reasons, however, then 
those reasons are what justify the judgment, not the fact that 
some authority says so, and we should be able to identify and 
evaluate those reasons directly. 
 
In sum, “Because I said so!” is not a good reason to believe 
something, unless whatever is said is supported by reasons. 
Nevertheless, there are many religiously-motivated animal 
advocacy organizations and thinkers and the suggested readings 
and web pages reference them.  
 
Introduction to Animal Ethics  
 
Finally, we will read the prefaces and introductions to our main 
texts. They are all interesting; Singer’s is especially important to the 
historic development of the animal movement. We can use 
Regan’s “cat case” and its variants as a unifying theme for inquiry. 
We will try to determine which broad view below is supported by 
the best moral reasons: 
 
A. Any (or almost any) use of animals is morally permissible; 
there are no moral obligations to animals. 
B. Seriously harming animals (e.g., causing them pain and 
suffering, killing them, etc.) is morally permissible provided 
they are housed in comfortable cages.  
C. Seriously harming animals is permissible provided they are 
housed in comfortable cages, treated gently and killed 
painlessly.  
D. Seriously harming animals is typically morally wrong, even if 
they are housed in comfortable cages, treated gently and 
killed painlessly.  
 
Discussion Questions  
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
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on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people about the moral questions that 
these Chapters open with. What are some of the most 
common answers that would be given? What reasons would 
you often hear in favor of these answers? Are these reasons 
generally good reasons or not? Why? 
2. Based on the readings about logic and arguments, explain 
(i) what an argument is, (ii) what makes arguments good or 
bad (e.g., explain the concepts of validity and soundness), 
and (iii) what one does to try to show that an argument is 
sound or unsound (e.g., explain the concept of a 
counterexample). If you have any other questions about 
what arguments are and how to identify and evaluate them, 
ask them here. We will be practicing identifying and 
evaluating arguments throughout the course. 
3. Complete the moral theory building exercises above. What 
does your moral theory (or theories) look like? According 
to your theory(s), what is it about wrong actions that seem 
to make them wrong, and what is it about morally 
permissible / obligatory / good actions that make them like 
that? What follows from your theory (or theories) for how 
human beings should be treated? What follows for animals 
(and which animals)? 
4. Which moral theory (or theories) that Rachels and Regan 
discuss seem best, i.e., most likely to identify the 
(approximate) truth about the nature of morally 
permissible and obligatory actions? Which seems worst, 
i.e., false? Why?  
5. What observations do you have about the Prefaces, 
Introductions, and Prologs to each of the books on animal 
ethics? What strikes you as interesting, provocative, 
controversial and otherwise worthy of comment and 
reflection? 
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE (SOME) ANIMALS LIKE? 
ANIMAL MINDS AND HARMS TO ANIMALS  
 
Overview 
 
If any animals have minds, and thus are conscious, then they can 
be harmed, and thus how they are treated raises moral issues. And, 
arguably, there are moral obligations towards animals only if they 
have minds, so questions about animal ethics very much depend 
on what animals are like. This Chapter we will get an overview of 
the scientific and philosophical literature on whether any animals 
are conscious, whether any are sentient (i.e., capable of sensation 
or feeling, especially of pleasures and pains), and so whether 
various species of animals have minds and, if so, what their 
mental, psychological and/or emotional lives might be like. We 
will discuss how anyone could know or reasonably believe some 
claim about animals’ minds.  
 
Readings 
 
Note: some of the discussion of animal minds immediately 
overlaps with ethical questions, but we will attempt to focus 
this week just on animal minds.  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 1. Do Animals Have Minds? pp. 
3 – 25.  
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 4. Killing Animals. pp. 70 – 99.  
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – pp. 9 – 22, beginning “There is, 
however, one general defense of the practices...”, ending on 
the first paragraph on 22.  
 
EMPTY CAGES – pp. 53 – 61. 
 
Gruen: 1. Why animals matter (optional) 
 
Recommended Reading on Animal Minds / Cognitive 
Ethology: 
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• Colin Allen (http://mypage.iu.edu/~colallen/), 
“Animal Consciousness,” entry in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-
animal/ 
• Jonathan Balcombe, Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and 
The Nature of Feeling Good (MacMillan 2006) 
http://www.pleasurablekingdom.com/  
• Marc Bekoff’s web page and books: 
http://literati.net/Bekoff/  
• Clare Palmer, “Animals in Anglo-American 
Philosophy” http://www.h-
net.org/~animal/ruminations_palmer.html 
• Scott Wilson, “Animals and Ethics,” The Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anim-eth.htm  
• Lori Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/  
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Being Specific About Species 
 
In the first Chapter on logic, I made these two suggestions about 
identifying arguments: 
 
• Make the stated conclusion(s) and premise(s) precise in 
quantity: is something said to be true (or false) of all things 
(or people, or animals, etc.), or just some of them (and if so, 
which ones?)? 
• Clarify the intended meaning(s) of unclear or ambiguous 
words in conclusions or premises. 
 
These suggestions are relevant to thinking about animals’ minds 
since the category of “animal” is extremely broad: “animals” range 
from unicellular organisms, insects, invertebrates, vertebrates, 
birds, and to mammals of different kinds, including primates (like 
human beings). Since there are millions of species of animals, so 
when investigating whether animals’ have minds, the natural 
questions are, “Which animals?” or, “What do you mean by 
‘animals’? Which animals are you referring to?”  
Sometimes we forget to notice that these same questions 
should often be asked about human beings’ mental lives. The 
mental lives of, e.g., newborn babies, five-year-olds, “normal” 
adults, cognitively disabled individuals, and Alzheimer’s patients 
surely differ greatly. So if someone says that (all) animals don’t 
have minds like human beings’ minds, we should ask which human 
beings, since many some, if not, many animals have mental lives 
comparable to, if not richer than, many human beings’ minds. 
That’s a possibility: whether we should think it’s true, of course, 
depends on what the research shows about the varieties of 
animals’ and humans’ minds and mental capacities.  
Our readings primarily focus on mammals and birds, although 
there is some discussion of fish, invertebrates (such as octopi) and 
even some research on insects. But, again, it seems likely the 
minds of different mammals (if any have minds) are also different: 
e.g., a mouse’s mental life is likely quite different from a 
chimpanzee’s (especially if that chimp has been taught sign 
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language). Additional research on different kinds of animals’ 
minds will be discussed in later sections of the course: e.g., 
research on the minds of chickens, cows, and pigs will be 
discussed in the sections on animal agriculture; rats and mice, cats, 
dogs and primates in the sections of animal experimentation, and 
so on.  
 
How Do We Know? Arguments from Analogy & Inference to 
the Best Scientific Explanation 
 
Epistemology is an area of philosophy that asks how we know things 
and what it is for a belief to be reasonable and supported by good 
evidence. How might we know that any animals have minds, or 
reasonably believe any such claims? We can call this question “The 
Epistemological Problem of Animal Minds.”  
Before we think about this (hard) problem, it’s worthwhile to 
mention that philosophers (and some psychologists and 
neuroscientists) worry about a more general (hard) problem called 
“The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds” regarding humans’ 
minds. The problem is that each of us only has “direct access” to 
our own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings: we cannot directly 
“see” that anyone else is conscious and has a mind. All we see is 
external, overt behavior (including speech) and, presumably, 
somehow infer from this behavior that another individual has 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions somewhat like our own. 
Perhaps this inference is not consciously made, but how else could 
we know that other people have minds?!  
Believe it or not, this question has troubled philosophers for 
millennia and there is no widely accepted answer. Many 
philosophers argue, however, that we know that other people have 
minds either by reasoning by analogy or by reasoning from the 
best explanation of some phenomena, in this case, the overt 
behavior.  
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To reason by analogy is, most simply, to reason like this:  
 
• Thing 1 has these characteristics a, b, and c; 
• Thing 2 has characteristics a & b; 
• Thing 2 is relevantly similar to Thing 1; 
• Therefore, probably Thing 2 has characteristic c too.  
 
Or, even more simply: “These two things are similar in the 
relevant ways, so therefore what is true of one is probably true of 
the other.” The strength of an argument from analogy depends on 
how similar to two things are: the more similar, the stronger the 
analogy, obviously, and more likely the conclusion is to be true.  
To respond to the “Problem of other Minds,” someone might 
reason, “I behave these ways, have this kind of biology, and I have 
a mind. Other people behave in similar ways and have similar 
biology. Therefore, they probably have minds too.” It’s important to 
observe that we apparently often use the same kind of kind of 
reasoning about animals’ minds, as our authors demonstrate.  
The second common pattern of reasoning about minds is an 
argument from the best explanation: 
 
• There is some event that requires explanation.  
• Explanation or hypothesis E best explains that event (i.e., 
is a better explanation than other candidate 
explanations in that it makes sense of more of the 
data/observations, allows predication, is simpler, fits 
with pre-existing knowledge, etc.)  
• Therefore, probably E, and what’s entailed by E, are true.  
 
This pattern of reasoning is often applied to animal behavior: an 
animal does something (e.g., reacts in some interesting way to new 
surroundings); we try to figure out if this reaction would be better 
explained on the hypothesis that (a) this animal is a mindless 
automaton or (b) this animal has a conscious mind (or some other 
explanation, perhaps with greater details than [b]). How this 
reasoning will work out very much depends on the details of the 
case, but it’s important to note that we use this pattern of 
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reasoning to investigate both humans’ and animals’ minds.  
 
A Source of Doubts: Necessary Conditions for Having a 
Mind 
 
Many who argue (or have argued, in the case of historical figures) 
that animals don’t have minds often claim that there is (or are) 
necessary condition(s) for having a mind, animals lack that necessary 
condition, and therefore they are mindless. So, some have claimed 
that a being has a mind only if, e.g., that being has language, and 
argued that animals are mindless since they can’t speak. Critics 
tend to challenge these claims by either arguing that that (some) 
animals meet this necessary condition or by arguing that it’s false 
that this condition is a necessary one: a being can have a mind 
even if it lacks this condition. They also tend to point out that 
many such principles imply that human infants are mindless, 
which seems to be false (and perhaps must be false, since such 
infants do learn language, and that can happen only if they have 
minds already, before having language).  
These are a few central concepts to keep in mind while 
reading the interesting and informative readings for this Chapter.  
 
Discussion Questions  
 
1. For many philosophical issues, a good place to start is to 
reflect on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them what the minds 
or mental lives of various species of animals are like, 
whether (any) animals are conscious, can feel, can think, can 
reason, have emotions and so on. What are some of the most 
common answers that would be given? What reasons would 
you often hear in favor of these answers? Are these reasons 
generally good reasons or not? Why? 
2. There are historical and contemporary doubts that any 
animals possess minds. Summarize these doubts. Explain 
whether these doubts are reasonable or not, in your view.  
3. What are animals’ minds like, according to most 
contemporary scientists and philosophers? What kind of 
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mental states do (any) animals have, e.g., beliefs, desires, 
memory, reasoning, planning, expectations for the future, 
self-awareness, emotions, etc.? Summarize the research, 
focusing on different mental states for different species or 
kinds of animals, if appropriate.  
4. How would one know or reasonably believe some claim about 
the mental states of animals? Explain what kind of 
reasoning processes and evidence philosophers, scientists 
and “ordinary people” appeal to when they argue that 
animals have minds.  
5. What is it to “harm” someone? Can (any) animals be 
harmed? If so, which kinds of animals? How can they be 
harmed? Explain and defend your answers.  
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
 
Paper option 
 
First, please read Jim Pryor’s “Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy 
Paper” at 
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html  
 
Assignment 
 
For an audience unfamiliar with any of the material of this course, 
write a short paper where you present and discuss the most 
important arguments for the view that some animals have minds. Be 
specific about what kinds of animals you are discussing, what you 
mean by “minds,” and explain the variety of reasons why someone 
should believe that these animals have minds. Although this might 
seem like “common sense,” people have doubted that animals 
have minds; therefore, explain the best or most common 
objections to the view that animals have minds, i.e., arguments 
that animals do not have minds. Explain what you think people 
should think about this issue and why. 
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CHAPTER 3: IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: SOME 
MORAL ARGUMENTS 
 
Overview 
 
This chapter will survey the most influential “theories of animal 
ethics,” i.e., general theories that attempt to explain the nature and 
extent of our moral obligations toward animals, which have been 
used to argue in defense of animals. As we will see, these theories 
are often extensions or developments of the moral theories that 
have been developed to explain how humans ought to treat other 
human beings. These thinkers often argue that the moral theory 
(or theories) that best explain the nature and extent of our moral 
obligations to human beings (especially vulnerable ones, such as 
babies, children, the mentally challenged, the elderly, and so on) 
have positive implications for many animals as well. Thus, they 
often argue that there are no relevant differences between the kinds of 
cases to justify protecting human beings but allowing serious 
harms to animals and, therefore, animals are due moral protections 
comparable to at least those given to comparably-conscious, 
aware, sentient human beings.  
 
Readings 
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 1. All Animals Are Equal . . . or why 
the ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to 
extend equal consideration to animals too 
 
EMPTY CAGES – PART II MORAL RIGHTS: WHAT THEY 
ARE AND WHY THEY MATTER  
EMPTY CAGES – 3. Human Rights  
EMPTY CAGES – 4. Animal Rights (entire chapter or until p. 62, 
where objections begin: this section will be re-assigned below)  
 
Videos: Tom Regan:  
From 2006, “Animal Rights: An Introduction”: (at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTNNJspZXA4) 
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From 1989, “Does the animal kingdom need a bill of rights?”1 (at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xj-MJKFM0Zs )   
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 2. The Moral Club 
  
Gruen: 2. The natural and the normative (optional) 
 
  
                                               
 
1 “To the best of my recollection, the speech I gave, as presented on 
YouTube, was given in 1989, in London, under the auspices of the 
Royal Institution of Great Britain. It was part of a debate over the 
question, ‘Does the animal kingdom need a bill of rights?’ I spoke in 
favor of the proposal, as did Andrew Linzey and Richard Ryder. 
Germaine Greer and Mary Warnock spoke against it. For its time, the 
event was a big deal. As I recall, the BBC televised it throughout the 
UK on one of the national channels. The room (it was a formal 
setting, in a regal hall) was packed, those in  the audience as 
respectful as they were attentive. I do not think there was any formal, 
or informal, vote on the question. So who won the debate is not 
something anyone can know. I do know, though, that it was a 
memorable event in my life. For me, personally, I had never before 
(and have not since) had the opportunity to address so many people, 
at one time, and in so many different places, on the philosophy of 
animal rights. I will never forget it.” – Tom Regan, 2007 
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General Theories and Particular Cases 
 
This Chapter will get an initial presentation of three of the most 
influential methods of moral thinking for human to human 
interactions that have been extended to apply to human to animal 
interactions, i.e., how humans ought to treat non-human animals.  
These perspectives are, first, a demand for equality or equal moral 
consideration of interests (developed by Peter Singer; however he 
sometimes describes his ethical theory as a form of utilitarianism, 
although his book Animal Liberation does not presuppose it); 
second, a demand for respect of the moral right to respectful treatment 
(developed by Tom Regan); and, third, a demand that moral 
decisions be made fairly and impartially and the use of a novel 
thought experiment designed to ensure this (developed by Mark 
Rowlands, following John Rawls, the most influential political 
philosopher of the twentieth century).  
We want to try to focus on these theories in themselves and 
their implications for animals “in general,” without so much focus 
on what they imply for particular uses of animals, e.g., for food, 
fashion experimentation, entertainment, and other purposes.  This 
attempt to make things a bit more abstract and general might seem 
forced, and we will surely understand the theories more deeply 
more when we see them applied to particular cases. Nevertheless, 
we want to try to evaluate these theories as true or false, well-
supported or not, on their own terms. 
 
Arguments from Paradigm Cases: Inference to the Best 
Moral Explanation 
 
Earlier we saw that scientists (and philosophers) sometimes use a 
pattern of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation to 
explain non-moral phenomena, e.g., the existence of minds. 
Ethicists use this form of reasoning also, although what is usually 
being explained is some clear moral intuition, or a moral judgment 
that nearly everyone agrees on (and seemingly for good reason). 
Again, the pattern is something like this: 
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• A moral judgment – J – seems true, and what makes it true 
requires explanation.  
• Moral explanation or hypothesis T best explains the truth of 
J (i.e., T is a better explanation than other candidate 
explanations in that it makes sense of more of the 
data/observations/similar moral intuitions, allows us to 
make other moral judgments (thus enabling a kind of 
prediction, perhaps), is simpler, fits with pre-existing 
knowledge, etc.)  
• Therefore, probably T, and what’s entailed by T, are true.  
  
Singer seems to use this pattern of reasoning, starting with the 
widely accepted moral judgments that racism and sexism (and other 
prejudices) are wrong. He gives an analysis of what racism and sexism 
are – they are not easy to define – and gives an explanation for why 
they are wrong, arguing that this explanation is a better 
explanation than some rival explanations. He then argues that this 
explanation, which appeals to the principle of equality of consideration of 
interests, has positive implications for animals.  Since many animals 
have interests, the prejudice that results in their interests being 
ignored is speciesism.  
Regan argues similarly, starting with the informed intuition 
that the men in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study were treated wrongly 
(p. 44; elsewhere he uses historical cases of harmful medical 
experiments on retarded children1). He argues that the best 
explanation why they way these men (and children) were treated was 
wrong has positive implications for animals. He argues that these 
men had moral rights to life, bodily integrity, and respectful 
treatment. He develops the “subject of a life” sufficient condition 
for having basic moral rights to life, to bodily integrity and 
respectful treatment, shows that this criterion for moral rights 
applies to many animals as well, and that they thereby have moral 
rights as well.  
                                               
 
1 “Empty Cages: Animal Rights & Vivisection,” essay at 
http://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/  
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In both cases, the pattern is to start with what we are 
confident with, think about the best reasons to support that 
confident judgment, and see that that these reasons have 
implications for areas that we perhaps have not thought about as 
carefully. We then see that that we have to revise our previous 
judgments about that new kind of case or, if we are to be consistent, 
revise our initial judgments (e.g., about the human cases), or argue 
that nothing follows from one kind of case to another because 
they are relevantly dissimilar. Singer, Regan and Rowlands, as well 
as the others, are clear on the logical options.   
 
Sufficient Conditions for Taking Someone’s Interests 
Seriously  
 
The cases for animals can be seen as an attempt to identify this 
‘this’ here: 
 
If a being is like this  ____, then we must take its interests 
seriously, it’s wrong to harm it (except for very good reasons), 
we must respect it, etc.   
 
Animal advocates typically argue that if we look at what we think 
about human beings, it appears that we think (or should think) 
that all human beings, especially those who are vulnerable – the 
very young and old – deserve such protections: e.g., none should 
be eaten, worn and experimented on. These philosophers argue 
that, for human beings, we seem to think the ‘this’ above is just 
consciousness or sentience or, as Regan puts it, being a “subject of 
a life,” and that this is a sufficient condition for it being the case that a 
being is wrong to harm. They argue that this principle applies to 
(some) animals as well, those animals that possess the relevant 
characteristics that humans have.  
Most critics of this reasoning attempt to find other 
characteristics that would account for the wrongness of harming 
human beings, but seek characteristics that only human beings 
have and no animals have. The challenge is, first, finding these 
characteristics and, second, explaining why they are morally 
relevant.  
32 
 
 
Again, the Issue is Not (Necessarily) Animal “Rights”  
 
To revisit an issue introduced in the first Chapter, sometimes 
people describe all “pro-animal” thinkers as “animal rights” 
advocates. This isn’t correct: e.g., Singer, for one, argues in defense 
of animals without much mentioning any idea of rights. So, again, 
one can think that animals’ interests must be taken seriously, that 
it’s seriously wrong to harm animals in most circumstances, that 
animals have a high “moral status,” etc., but not think that they 
have rights or, at least, not find that to be a useful way of 
presenting one’s views.  
       But what are moral rights anyway? First, views that maintain 
that animals (and human beings) have moral rights are often moral 
theories that appeal to the idea of a moral right in explaining what 
makes wrong actions wrong and permissible actions permissible: 
usually they claim that an action is impermissible if it violates a 
right; thus, rights are constraints on behavior. We will examine 
two rights theories – Regan’s and Rowlands’ – in detail. While 
these theories typically support the view that most harmful uses of 
animals are morally permissible, the theory and the particular 
judgments about what’s morally permissible are, strictly, speaking, 
distinct. 
 A bit about moral rights: moral rights, if they exist, are not “man 
made,” and individuals who have right have them even if others do 
not recognize or acknowledge that. Moral rights are not “granted” 
or “given” by anyone: e.g., slaves had moral rights (to life, to 
liberty) even though many people did not respect or acknowledge these rights. 
When these moral rights were acknowledged or recognized, it is 
not the case that slaves were “given” or “granted” moral rights, 
since they already had them. Thus, sometimes people often ask 
whether animals should be “given” rights. Since moral rights are 
not “given,” this question is founded on a mistaken assumption.   
  Moral rights are always a right to something or a right from 
something, e.g., a right to life or a right from interference. There are 
no generic moral rights – just plain moral rights – so if someone 
claims that animals have (or lack) moral rights, the question we 
must ask is, “A right to what, or right from what?” Here there are 
many candidates: rights to life, to respectful treatment, to not 
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being caused to suffer, to not be harmed, to have their interests 
taken into consideration, to liberty, to not being considered 
“property,” to not be “used” to benefit others, and on and on: 
there are many possible moral rights to consider.  
      Whenever we discuss a claim that animals have or lack moral 
rights, we need to be specific on which moral right(s) is under 
consideration. Some advocates of animal use have claimed that, 
e.g., animals have a right to be eaten, and a right to be skinned 
(alive!) for their fur, and thus calling themselves advocates of 
animal rights! Focusing on specific moral rights, such as rights to 
not be caused various kinds of harm, will prevent those who harm 
animals from being considered legitimate animal rights advocates.  
       Finally, appeals to moral rights can sometimes be “question 
begging,” which means to say that they just assume the conclusion 
that’s being defended, stating it in other words instead of 
supporting it. This can happen with other moral issues: someone 
might claim that abortion, i.e., killing unborn fetuses, is wrong 
because unborn fetuses have a moral right to life. Unless this person 
explains why fetuses have such a right, this argument might amount 
to just saying that killing fetuses is wrong because killing fetuses is 
wrong, which is just restating the conclusion as one’s premise. 
Similarly, someone might say that eating animals is not wrong 
because humans have a moral right to eat them. Again, unless this 
person explains why we should think that we have this right, what 
might be said here is just that eating animals is not wrong because it is 
not wrong for us to eat animals. Since arguments should never just 
assume their conclusion, or merely restate it in different words, 
these arguments are no good.  
 Again, the core questions in ethics and animals are what moral 
categories we should think specific uses of animals fall into – 
morally permissible, morally obligatory, or morally 
impermissible/wrong – and the reasons why we should think this. 
Thinking in terms of moral rights can make the issues more 
confusing than they have to be.  
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Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them what kind of 
moral obligations we have towards animals (perhaps you 
should ask about specific animals or different kinds of 
animals). Focusing on possible broadly “pro-animal” responses, 
what are some of the most common answers that would be 
given? What reasons would you often hear in favor of these 
answers? Are these reasons generally good reasons or not? 
Why? 
2. For an audience who has not read the texts, explain Singer’s view 
about what moral obligations we have towards animals and 
his main arguments favor of that view. What questions and 
objections do you have for him? How would he respond? 
Are his arguments sound? Why or why not? 
3. For an audience who has not read the texts, explain Regan’s view 
about what moral obligations we have towards animals and 
his main arguments favor of that view. What questions and 
objections do you have for him? How would he respond? 
Are his arguments sound? Why or why not? 
4. For an audience who has not read the texts, explain Rowlands’ 
view about what moral obligations we have towards 
animals and his main arguments favor of that view. What 
questions and objections do you have for him? How would 
he respond? Are his arguments sound? Why or why not? 
5. Should people find any (or all) of the cases given in defense 
of animals to be persuasive? Which, if any, is strongest, in 
your opinion, and why? If you think people should be 
persuaded, why is it that they often are not? (If people 
should not be persuaded, why are some people convinced?). 
Any other questions or objections from anything from this 
section can be asked here.  
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
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Paper Option 
 
For an audience unfamiliar with ethics, logic and animal ethics, 
explain the strongest broad moral case to be made in defense of 
animals (this could be a single theorist’s approach, or perhaps it 
could be a combination approach). Explain what this case implies 
in general for animals and how one defends or supports such a 
theory about how animals deserve to be treated. Raise and respond 
to at least three of what you think are the most important 
objections to your arguments or your position. 4-6 pages.  
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CHAPTER 4: OBJECTIONS TO DEFENSES OF 
ANIMALS AND DEFENDING ANIMAL USE  
 
Overview 
 
This Chapter we will survey the most influential general moral 
theories that have been appealed to argue in defense of animal use 
and/or to object to the theories developed in defense of animals. 
As we will see, these theories are often extensions or 
developments of the moral theories that have been developed to 
explain how humans ought to treat other human beings. These 
writers often argue that the moral theory (or theories) that best 
explain the nature and extent of our moral obligations to human 
beings (especially vulnerable ones, such as babies, children, the 
mentally challenged, the elderly, and so on) do not have positive 
implications for animals. Thus, they argue that there are relevant 
differences between the kinds of cases that justify protecting all 
human beings but allowing serious harms to animals. 
 
Readings  
 
EMPTY CAGES – 4. Animal Rights (pp. 62-74) 
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 5. Man’s Dominion . . . a short 
history of speciesism (See especially the discussion of Aquinas, 
Descartes, Kant and thinkers discussed in The Enlightenment and 
After) 
 
Tibor Machan, “Why Animal Rights Don’t Exist” at 
http://www.strike-the-root.com/4/machan/machan43.html 
and “The Myth of Animal Rights” at 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/machan/machan52.html    
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1HOtggYuMQ  
 
Carl Cohen, “Why Animals Do Not Have Rights,” from 
Cohen and Regan, The Animal Rights Debate (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001) at  
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/cohen-ar-
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debate.pdf  
 
Video: Carl Cohen, "Why Animals Do Not Have Rights”: at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbk7xY9t-UQ  
 
Ray Frey, “Animal Research: The Starting Point” (1-page 
selection), from Why Animal Experimentation Matters.  
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/frey-
experimentation.pdf  (this file needs to be corrected)  
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 1. All Animals Are Equal – review 
the objections that Singer discusses 
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 2. The Moral Club – review the 
objections that Rowlands discusses  
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General Theories and Particular Cases 
 
Like the last Chapter, we want to try to focus on these theories in 
themselves and their implications for animals “in general,” without 
so much focus on what they imply for particular uses of animals, 
e.g., for food, fashion experimentation, entertainment, and other 
purposes.  This will likely be harder than the last Chapter because 
many objections to pro-animal theories come from particular 
cases, e.g. arguments like these: 
 
1. Animal experimentation is morally permissible, if not 
obligatory. 
2. But if Regan’s theory is true, then animal experimentation 
is wrong.  
3. Therefore, Regan’s theory of animal rights is not true. 
 
And: 
 
1. There’s nothing wrong with raising animals to eat them. 
2. But if there’s nothing wrong with raising animals to eat 
them, then animals’ interests don’t deserve equal 
consideration. 
3. If animals’ interests don’t deserve equal consideration, then 
Singer’s theory is false. 
4. Therefore, Singer’s theory is false.  
 
Of course, we want to know for what reasons we should accept 
these first premises, especially if we are familiar with ethics!  
But perhaps a way to avoid some of these particular cases about 
animals at this time is to focus on what the theories of the critics 
of pro-animal thinking imply for human beings, especially the 
young, old, weak and powerless. Various kinds of 
contractarianisms support poor treatment of animals, but they 
seem to support poor treatment of humans as well, and so 
contractarians often feel a need to defend themselves from these 
objections. Maybe these theories can sometimes be better 
evaluated from the more neutral concern of human-to-human 
ethics. 
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In evaluating moral theories and thinking about ethics in 
general, you want to try to have your principles or theories have 
the right implications for particular cases and have those 
implications for the right reasons. Unfortunately, there is no exact 
formula for doing this! Ethics can be hard.  
 
Necessary Conditions for Taking Someone’s Interests 
Seriously: Cases Against Animals 
 
While animal advocates focus on sufficient conditions for someone 
being in “The Moral Club” (as Rowlands puts it), anti-animal 
theorists tend to focus on necessary conditions, claiming that:  
 
We must take a being’s interests seriously, it’s wrong to harm it 
(except for very good reasons), we must respect it, etc., only if 
it is like this: ___.  
 
They then typically fill in that blank with rather cognitively 
advanced abilities: sophisticated reasoning, thinking about one’s 
thinking, intellectual achievement, religious worship, and so on.  
Their challenge, of course, comes from the fact that many human 
beings lack such sophisticated minds, yet we think we must take 
their interests seriously. This problem for anti-animal theorists is 
known as the “argument from marginal cases.” To get around it, 
these theorists often attempt to do some intellectual acrobatics, 
trying to relate non-mentally sophisticated human beings (who 
seem to lack the stated necessary condition for, e.g., having any 
moral rights) to sophisticated human beings in peculiar ways. We 
will attempt to pin down their reasoning and see if it seems to be 
generally valid or is developed as an ad hoc response to this 
problem or worse.  
 
Finding Relevant Differences from Arguments from 
Paradigm Cases: Inference to Better Moral Explanations? 
 
Regarding above, anti-animal thinkers need to offer explanations 
of the clear cut cases of wrongs to human beings and not have 
those explanations have positive implications for animals.  
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Common Invalid Arguments 
 
An argument is invalid when the premises do not logically lead to 
the conclusion. Many objections to cases against animals are of a 
common invalid argument form called “denying the antecedent,” 
where the premises do not lead to the conclusion or the 
conclusion logically follow from the premises. This argument is 
invalid: 
 
1. If conscious, sentient animals have moral rights then 
seriously harming them is typically wrong. 
2. But animals do not have any moral rights. 
3. Therefore, animal experimentation is morally permissible.  
 
This argument is of the same invalid pattern as this argument:  
 
1. If you (the reader) were a professional basketball player, 
then you would be over a foot tall. [TRUE!] 
2. But you are not a professional basketball player. [TRUE!?] 
3. Therefore, you are not over a foot tall. [FALSE] 
 
Non-professional basketball players should see that these premises 
are true but the conclusion false: this means that the premises do 
not lead to the conclusion. The same is true about the first 
argument above since the pattern is the same. The point applies to 
this invalid argument too: 
 
1. If animals are “equal” to humans, as “important” has 
humans, have the same “moral status” as humans, then 
seriously harming them is typically wrong.  
2. But animals are not “equal” to humans, not as 
“important” has humans, and do have the same “moral 
status” as humans. 
3. Therefore, seriously harming them is not typically wrong. 
 
Furthermore, what it means to say these things about “equality,” 
“importance,” and “moral status” are not at all clear: much 
explanation would be needed for the kind of understanding 
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needed to decide whether this claim is true or false.  
 
Making the Discussion Concrete 
 
Again, the core questions in ethics and animals are what moral 
categories we should think specific uses of animals fall into – 
morally permissible, morally obligatory, or morally impermissible / 
wrong – and the reasons why we should think this. This Chapter 
we should be trying to find the strongest, most important or at 
least most common and influential theories that would seem to 
support the conclusion that most (or any) routine, harmful uses of 
animals are just not morally wrong.  
 
Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them what kind of 
moral obligations we have towards animals (perhaps you 
should ask about specific animals or different kinds of 
animals). Focusing on possible broadly “anti-animal” responses 
(which some might describe as “pro-human”), what are some of 
the most common answers that would be given? What 
reasons would you often hear in favor of these answers? Are 
these reasons generally good reasons or not? Why? 
2. What are the strongest, most important and/or most 
interesting objections that critics raise to the moral cases in 
defense of animals? Are these objections successful, i.e., do 
they defeat any of the defenses of animals (from the last 
Chapter)? Are these arguments sound? Why or why not? 
3. For an audience who has not read the texts, explain Kant’s, 
Cohen’s, and Machan’s arguments against animals. What 
questions and objections do you have to them? How might 
they respond? Are their arguments sound? Why or why 
not? 
4. For an audience who has not read the texts, explain the 
arguments “against animals” from contractarianism or the 
social contract theory (especially see Taylor’s discussion of 
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Carruthers, and Regan’s discussion of Narveson from 
Chapter 1). What questions and objections do you have for 
them? How might they respond? Are their arguments 
sound? Why or why not? 
5. Should people find any (or all) of the cases “against 
animals” to be persuasive? Which, if any, is strongest, in 
your opinion, and why? If you think people should be 
persuaded, why is it that they often are not? (If people 
should not be persuaded, why are some people convinced?). 
Any other questions or objections from anything from this 
section can be asked here.  
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
 
Paper option 
 
Assignment: For an audience unfamiliar with ethics, logic and 
animal ethics, explain the strongest broad moral case to be made 
“against” animals and/or as a critical response to pro-animal 
ethical theorizing (this could be a single theorist’s approach, or 
perhaps it could be a combination approach). Explain what this 
case implies in general for animals and how one defends or 
supports such a theory about how animals deserve to be treated. 
Raise and respond to at least three of what you think are the most 
important objections to your arguments or your position. 4-6 
pages.  
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CHAPTER 5: WEARING AND EATING ANIMALS 
 
Overview 
 
Animal advocacy organization Vegan Outreach observes that “The 
number of animals killed for fur in the U.S. each year is 
approximately equal to the human population of Illinois. The 
number of animals killed in experimentation in the U.S. each year 
is approximately equal to the human population of Texas. The 
number of mammals and birds farmed and slaughtered in the U.S. 
each year is approximately equal to one and two-thirds the entire human 
population of Earth. Over 99% of the animals killed in the U.S. each 
year die to be eaten.”1 This Chapter we will focus on the moral 
arguments for and against using animals for fur and for food (as 
well as for different kinds of animal-food production, e.g., “factory 
farm” versus “traditional animal husbandry”), as well as the 
relationships between these arguments: what one thinks about the 
morality of the fur industry might have implications for the 
morality of meat, dairy and egg industries.   
 
Readings  
 
On the Fur Industry:  
 
EMPTY CAGES – PART III SAYING AND DOING  
EMPTY CAGES – 5. What We Learn from Alice  
EMPTY CAGES – PART IV THE METAMORPHOSES  
EMPTY CAGES – 7. Turning Animals into Clothes  
 
OPTIONAL Reading & Viewing on the Fur Industry: 
Fur industry representatives:  
• Fur Commission USA, a non-profit association 
representing over 600 mink farmers in the United 
States http://www.furcommission.com See especially 
                                               
 
1 Matt Ball, “Activism and Veganism,” at 
http://www.veganoutreach.org/advocacy/path.html  
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the pages  “Animal Rights versus Animal Welfare” and 
“Fur on Film” 
• Fur Information Council of America: www.fur.org/ 
• National Animal Interest Alliance (defends all uses of 
animals, so relevant to all issues below also): 
http://www.naiaonline.org/about/index.htm  
Critics of the fur industry:  
• HSUS: http://www.hsus.org/furfree/,  
• Mercy for Animals: 
http://www.mercyforanimals.org/fur_farms.asp,  
• PETA: http://www.furisdead.com/,  
• Tribe of Heart, producers of “The Witness” film: 
http://www.tribeofheart.org/  
 
On the Animal Agriculture Industries: 
 
EMPTY CAGES – 6. Turning Animals into Food  
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 3. Down on the Factory Farm . . . 
or what happened to your dinner when it was still an animal 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 4. Becoming a Vegetarian . . . or 
how to produce less suffering and more food at a reduced cost 
to the environment 
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 5. Using Animals for Food 
 
Gruen: 3. Eating animals (optional) 
 
Jan Narveson, “A Defense of Meat Eating” (2 pages):  
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/narveson.pdf (See 
Rachels and Regan’s discussions of contractarianism or the 
social contract from week one).  
 
Temple Grandin, “Thinking Like Animals” (3 pages; last ½ 
page is where the “ethics” is offered): 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/grandin.pdf  
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Ray Frey, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism Again: Protest or 
Effectiveness?”:  
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/frey-veg.pdf  
 
Optional: Peter Singer & Jim Mason, Ch. 17, “The Ethics of 
Eating Meat,” pp. 241- 273, from The Way We Eat: Why Our 
Food Choices Matter (Rodale 2006): 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/way-we-eat.pdf  
 
Optional: The following sources, among others, are discussed 
in this chapter: Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall’s The River Cottage 
Meat Book: http://www.rivercottage.net/ (Amazon); Michael 
Pollan’s “An Animals Place” 
http://www.michaelpollan.com/article.php?id=55 and The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma  
http://www.michaelpollan.com/omnivore.php ; Roger 
Scruton’s Animal Rights and Wrongs http://www.roger-
scruton.com/rs-books.html ; Gaverick Matheny, “Least Harm: 
A Defense of Vegetarianism,” 
http://www.jgmatheny.org/matheny%202003.pdf  
 
Recommended Reading & Viewing: 
Some advocates of animal agriculture:  
National Institute of Animal Agriculture: 
http://www.animalagriculture.org  
American Meat Institute: http://www.meatami.com/  
Animal Agriculture Alliance: http://www.animalagalliance.org  
“Best Food Nation,” http://www.bestfoodnation.com/ 
 
National Chicken Council: 
http://www.nationalchickencouncil.com/  
US Poultry and Egg Association: http://poultryegg.org  
United Egg Producers: http://www.uepcertified.com/  
 
Contains VIDEO: The Veal Farm: http://www.vealfarm.com  
Contains VIDEO: “Dairy Farming Today”: 
http://www.dairyfarmingtoday.org  
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National Pork Producers Council: 
http://www.nppc.org/public_policy/animal_health.html  
National Pork Board:  http://www.pork.org, 
http://pork4kids.com/  
 
National Cattleman’s Association: http://beef.org and 
http://www.beeffrompasturetoplate.org/animalwelfare.aspx  
 
Advocates of non- factory-farm/intensive livestock 
production: 
Certified Humane: http://www.certifiedhumane.org  
Animal Compassion Foundation: 
http://www.animalcompassionfoundation.org  
 
Some critics of animal agriculture: 
Compassion Over Killing (http://cok.net): “Exposing routine 
cruelty in the chicken industry”: 
http://www.chickenindustry.com/  
Compassion Over Killing (http://cok.net): “Exposing the Truth 
about Eggs,” http://www.eggindustry.com/  
Compassionate Consumers’ film “Wegmans Cruelty”: 
http://WegmansCruelty.com  
Farm Sanctuary (http://farmsanctuary.org): 
http://factoryfarming.org  
Farmed Animal Net: http://farmedanimal.net/ (news service) 
HSUS: http://www.hsus.org/farm_animals/  
PETA: http://www.goveg.com/factoryFarming.asp  
United Poultry Concerns: http://www.upc-online.org/  
Vegan Outreach: http://www.veganoutreach.org/whyvegan/  
 
On vegetarian and veganism: 
American Dietetic Association’s Position Paper on Vegetarian 
Diets, JADA, June 2003 (Vol. 103, Issue 6, Pages 748-765): 
http://www.eatright.org/cps/rde/xchg/ada/hs.xsl/advocacy_
933_ENU_HTML.htm Full article at 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/ada-veg.pdf  
PCRM: http://pcrm.org/health/  
COK’s TryVeg.com page: http://www.tryveg.com  
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PETA’s Go Veg page: http://GoVeg.com  
Vegan Outreach’s Vegan Health page: 
http://www.veganhealth.org/    
Peter Singer and Jim Mason, The Way We Eat: Why Our Food 
Choices Matter (Rodale, 2006).  A recent discussion of the many ethical 
issues raised by animal agriculture and an evaluation of a range of 
responses to the issues.  
 
Matthew Halteman, “Compassionate Eating as Care of 
Creation,” on the intersection of animal ethics and faith issues 
(from a Christian perspective): 
http://www.hsus.org/religion/resources/compassionate_eatin
g_as_care_.html  
Christian Vegetarian Association: http://www.all-
creatures.org/cva/  
Jewish Vegetarians: http://www.jewishveg.com/  
 
  
50 
 
 
  
51 
 
 
Fur and Food 
 
Philosophers often don’t discuss the fur industry. However, the 
fur industry is huge. And many people who do not consider 
themselves strong animal advocates claim to oppose it. If we ask 
them why they oppose it, however, they often give reasons that 
seem to imply that killing animals for food is also wrong. Yet these 
same people often resist that conclusion. Their choice, if they wish 
to remain consistent then, is to revise their view about the fur 
industry, revise their view about the meat, dairy and egg industries, 
or find a relevant different between the fur and agriculture 
industries such that one is wrong and the other is not. Can they do 
it? 
 
Personal Challenges and Logic 
 
In my 15 or so years’ experience of teaching ethics courses, I have 
found that no topic brings out the rational and emotional best and 
worst in people than ethical questions about wearing and eating 
animals. This is not surprising since, unlike questions what other 
people should do, moral questions about animals are personal. As 
philosopher Peter Singer has observed, “For most human beings, 
especially in modern urban and suburban communities, the most 
direct form of contact with non-human animals is at mealtimes: 
we eat them”1 (and wear them). For most of us, then, our own 
behavior is challenged when we reflect on the reasons given to 
think that change is needed in our treatment of, and attitudes 
toward, animals. That the issue is personal presents unique 
challenges, and great opportunities, for intellectual and moral 
progress. 
This Chapter we will examine the common assumption that 
there is nothing wrong with harming animals – causing them pain, 
suffering, and an early death – so they might be eaten and worn. 
Our method, useful for better understanding all ethical debates, is 
                                               
 
1 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 3rd Ed. (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2002), p. 95.  
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to identify unambiguous and precise moral conclusions and make 
all the reasons in favor of the conclusion explicit, leaving no 
assumption unstated.  Especially important will be the third of the 
three rules (introduced in Chapter 1) for identifying and evaluating 
arguments: 
 
1. Make the stated conclusion(s) and premise(s) precise in 
quantity: is something said to be true (or false) of all things 
(or people, or animals, etc.), or just some of them (and if so, 
which ones?)? 
2. Clarify the intended meaning(s) of unclear or ambiguous 
words in conclusions or premises. 
3. State (any) assumed premises so that the complete pattern of 
reasoning in an argument is displayed and it is clear how 
the stated premise(s) logically leads to the conclusion.  
 
People often try to argue that killing animals to eat them is morally 
permissible by offering a quick premise like, “Meat tastes good,” 
or “I’ve always eaten meat.” They don’t seem to realize that they 
seem to be assuming the premises if something tastes good then its 
permissible to kill it to eat it (what if babies tasted good?!) and if you’ve 
always done some action then doing that action morally permissible, another 
arguably false premise.  
 
Harms to Animals (and Humans): The Facts  
 
Why is the treatment of animals a moral issue? The simple answer 
is that animals are harmed by the practices required to bring them 
to our plates and put them on our backs, and harms need moral 
defense. This unit reviews the case for these industries being 
extremely harmful to animals and looks at the industries’ response 
to these charges.  Harms to humans from eating animals (or eating 
animals to excess) are also detailed. Consider the position 
statement on vegetarianism from the leading authority on nutrition 
in North America based on their sixteen-page review of the recent 
nutrition research: 
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It is the position of the American Dietetic Association that 
appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total 
vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, 
and may provide health benefits in the prevention and 
treatment of certain diseases. Well-planned vegetarian diets are 
appropriate for individuals during all stages of the life cycle, 
including pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, and 
adolescence, and for athletes. . .. An evidence-based review 
showed that vegetarian diets can be nutritionally adequate in 
pregnancy and result in positive maternal and infant health 
outcomes. The results of an evidence-based review showed 
that a vegetarian diet is associated with a lower risk of death 
from ischemic heart disease. Vegetarians also appear to have 
lower low-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels, lower blood 
pressure, and lower rates of hypertension and type 2 diabetes 
than nonvegetarians. Furthermore, vegetarians tend to have a 
lower body mass index and lower overall cancer rates. Features 
of a vegetarian diet that may reduce risk of chronic disease 
include lower intakes of saturated fat and cholesterol and 
higher intakes of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, nuts, soy 
products, fiber, and phytochemicals.1  
 
Ethical behavior can require self-sacrifice; however, this scientific 
research suggests that ethical behavior – i.e., if killing animals to 
eat them is wrong – can lead to personal health benefits.  
 
Factory Farming vs. Vegetarianism vs. Veganism vs. 
“Humane” Animal Agriculture vs.?? 
 
To return to the first Chapter, we can envision Regan’s “cat case” 
transformed into a fur-bearer and an animal farmed for food. Here 
are some of the options: 
                                               
 
1 “Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian Diets,” 
Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 2009 Jul;109(7): 1266-82. 
http://www.eatrightpro.org/resource/practice/position-and-
practice-papers/position-papers/vegetarian-diets  
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A. Any (or almost any) use of those animals is morally 
permissible; there are no moral obligations to those 
animals. 
B. Seriously harming those animals (e.g., causing them pain 
and suffering, killing them, etc.) is morally permissible 
provided they are housed in comfortable cages.  
C. Seriously harming those animals is permissible provided 
they are housed in comfortable cages, treated gently and 
killed painlessly.  
D. Seriously harming those animals is typically morally wrong, 
even if they are housed in comfortable cages, treated gently 
and killed painlessly.  
 
Option (C) is intended to be analogous to so-called “humane” 
animal farming and slaughter. While everyone agrees that this is 
better for animals than factory farming, the question still remains: 
is this treatment of animals is morally permissible or not? If 
something like option (D) is the most ethically defensible option, 
then (C) is not.   
 
“Painless” and “Humane” Killing 
 
Option (C) includes the often heard claim that, “if animals are 
killed painlessly, then that’s morally OK.” This assumption might 
be true, but it’s worthwhile to notice that we reject it about 
ourselves. In most cases, if we were killed, even “painlessly,” we 
would be deprived of our (hopefully valuable) futures: everything 
we would have experienced is taken from us. Insofar as animals 
have futures, and killing them prevents them from experiencing 
those futures (and any of the good experiences they would have 
had), it seems that the same basic reasons why it is wrong to kill us 
might apply to many animals. So the assumption that “painless 
killing is automatically morally permissible” should be, at least, 
strongly doubted: good reasons would need to be given its favor.  
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Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them whether it’s 
morally permissible to wear and/or eat animals and why. 
What are some of the most common answers that would 
be given? What reasons would you often hear in favor of 
these answers? Are these reasons generally good reasons or 
not? Why? 
2. Describe how animals are treated by the fur and animal 
agribusiness industries: what happens to animals when 
used for these purposes? What are the facts? How do these 
industries describe how they treat animals? Are they correct 
in their description of the facts?  
3. Explain the strongest moral arguments for the conclusions 
that (a) it’s wrong to kill animals for fur and/or the fur 
industry is morally impermissible and (b) it’s wrong to raise 
and kill animals for meat, milk, and eggs and/or the animal 
agriculture industry – i.e., factory farming – is morally 
impermissible. Are these arguments sound or not? Explain 
and defend your views.  
4. Explain the strongest and/or most common moral 
arguments for the conclusions that (a) it’s not wrong to kill 
animals for fur and/or (b) it’s not wrong to raise and kill animals 
for meat, milk and eggs. Are these arguments sound or not? 
Explain and defend your views.  
5. Should people (at least in “modern,” industrialized 
societies) be vegetarians? Or should they be vegans? Or 
should they support smaller-scale, non-industrial, so-called 
“humane” animal farming and slaughter? Or should they 
support factory farming? Explain which response best 
captures our moral obligations and why.  
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
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Paper option 
 
Write a 4-6-page argumentative essay that addresses all these 
questions and defends your answers from the strongest and/or most 
common objections:  
 
• In our society, should animals and killed be raised to be 
eaten? What kind of treatment of farmed animals is morally 
permissible? Are there any changes that we are morally 
obligated to make regarding how chickens, pigs, cows and 
other (currently) farmed animals are treated? Defend your 
answers with reasons. 
• In our society, should animals and killed be raised to be fur-
trimmed and fur coats? What kind of treatment of fur-
bearers is morally permissible? Are there any changes that 
we are morally obligated to make regarding how fur-
bearers are treated? Defend your answers with reasons. 
• What are the relationships between your answers about the 
fur and food animals issues, and your reasons in favor of 
these answers? 
 
What should your personal response to these issues be? Should 
you buy or wear fur? Should you buy or eat meat, eggs and/or 
dairy products? If yes, from where? If no, why not?  
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTING ON ANIMALS; 
ANIMALS IN EDUCATION 
 
Overview 
 
This Chapter we will consider perhaps the most controversial 
ethical issues concerning animals, namely questions about the 
morality of animal experimentation and research for medical, 
scientific, psychological, educational and veterinary purposes. These 
issues are often considered most controversial because, unlike 
using animals for clothing, entertainment or even food, it is 
claimed that animal research provides significant medical benefits 
for humans that, some claim, could not be attained any other way than 
by using animals. Thus, this is an area where animals’ and humans’ 
interests are said to unavoidably conflict. This Chapter we will 
attempt to evaluate claims about the scientific and medical merit 
of animal experimentation, as these might be relevant to its morality 
(or the might not), and directly attempt to determine the morality 
of various kinds of animal use in science, medicine, education and 
research.  
 
Readings 
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 2. Tools for Research . . . your 
taxes at work 
 
EMPTY CAGES –  10. Turning Animals into Tools  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 6. Using Animals for Experiments  
 
Gruen: 4. Animal research (optional) 
 
“The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” 
New England Journal of Medicine, 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/cohen.pdf  
 
Adrian Morrison; “Personal Reflections on the “Animal-
Rights” Phenomenon”: http://www.the-
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aps.org/publications/tphys/2001html/February01/personal_r
eflections.htm; “First, animals aren’t people” http://www.the-
aps.org/pa/action/charity/morrison.htm 
 
Bob Speth, “Muddlers Beware: The Case for Philosophical 
Extremism,” (a review of Regan’s Empty Cages) Newsletter of the 
Society for Veterinary Medical Ethics, Volume 10, Number 3 
October 2004, pp. 9-13; Regan’s reply, pp. 14-18. 
http://www.vetmed.wsu.edu/org_SVME/images/vol10-3.pdf  
 
Charles Nicoll & Sharon Russell: selections at 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/nicoll%26russellona
nimalethics  
 
Stuart Derbyshire, “The hard arguments about vivisection”: 
http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CAFA7.htm  
 
Jonathan Balcombe, “Dissection: The Scientific Case for 
Alternatives,” Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, (4), 2, 
117-126, 2001. 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/balcombe.pdf  
This article is a summary of Balcombe, J.P. (2000). The Use of 
Animals in Higher Education: Problems: Alternatives and 
Recommendations.  Washington, DC: Humane Society 
Press. http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/humane
_bookshelf/the_use_of_animals_in_higher_education_proble
ms_alternatives_and_recommendations.html  
 
Recommended Reading & Viewing: 
Some advocates of animal experimentation:  
• Americans for Medical Progress: 
http://www.amprogress.org 
• Foundation for Biomedical Research: 
http://www.fbresearch.org/   
• National Association for Biomedical Research: 
http://www.nabr.org/  
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• American Association for Laboratory Animal Science 
http://www.aalas.org/  
Some critics of animal experimentation: 
 Scientific: 
• Americans For Medical Advancement: 
http://curedisease.com  
• Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM): 
http://pcrm.org/resch/  
• Medical Research Modernization Committee: 
http://www.mrmcmed.org  
Ethical: 
• HSUS: http://www.hsus.org/animals_in_research/ 
• PETA: http://www.stopanimaltests.org  
• AAVS: http://www.aavs.org/  
• NEAVS: http://www.neavs.org/  
• NAVS: http://www.navs.org 
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Science Does Not Answer Moral Questions 
 
An important thing to remember in discussing the morality of 
animal experimentation is that science does not answer moral questions. 
What benefits (if any) that result from any kind of experiment 
(human or animal) do not in themselves show that some experiment 
is morally justified. That occurs only in conjunction with moral 
principles and moral reasons, and those aren’t determined by the 
science. Making arguments logically valid can make this clear 
because then it will be obvious that there’s a “leap” from some 
claim about benefits or scientific results to a, therefore, doing this is 
morally permissible. As stated, the conclusion does not yet follow. 
 
Theoretical Foundations and Unprincipled Responses 
 
One way of addressing moral questions it to appeal to moral 
principles and general theories of morality and moral reasoning: 
philosophers often approach issues that way, and so it is often 
clear what their moral arguments are and what reasons are given 
for their premises. Many defenders of animal experimentation do 
not follow this pattern however and so we must make premises 
and conclusions clear and precise and, if needed, add the missing 
premise(s) needed to reveal the full pattern of reasoning. Here are 
a number of common arguments given in defense of animal 
experimentation that should be addressed before we get to the 
readings: 
 
“Benefits” Arguments 
 
Many people argue that there are medical benefits for humans  that 
result from animal experimentation, e.g., treatments and cures for 
diseases, improvements in health, and so forth – and that, 
therefore, animal experimentation is morally permissible. The 
suggested argument is this:   
 
(P1) Animal experimentation benefits humans. 
(C)  Therefore, animal experimentation is morally permissible.  
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There are many problems with this argument. First, (P1) is 
imprecise in many ways. Much animal experimentation is done 
without any expectation that it will yield (medical) benefits for 
humans. So (P1) should claim that some animal experimentation 
benefits humans. But there is more imprecision. It either says: 
 
(P2) Some animal experimentation benefits some humans,  
 
or  
 
(P3) Some animal experimentation benefits all humans. 
 
(P3) is false. About 30,000 people, many of whom are children, die 
each day from starvation, malnutrition, and lack of very basic medical 
care.1 These people, and at least millions of other humans, do not 
benefit from it. About (P2), as it is stated, few scientific, humanistic 
and/or ethical critics of animal experimentation deny it. There 
have been many, many experiments on animals. To claim that not 
one of them has led to any benefits for any humans – even just by 
good luck – would be to claim something false. So (P2) is true: 
some humans benefit medically from some animal experimentation.  
Some people seem to think this automatically shows that animal 
experimentation is morally permissible. Oddly, they often seem to 
think this supports a more precise conclusion that all animal 
experiments are permissible, even those that do not lead to any 
benefits for humans and are expected not to. But no such 
conclusions follow, for many reasons. First, just because some 
humans benefit from something does not entail that it is morally 
permissible for them to get it: e.g., some people might benefit 
from an extremely expensive medical procedure, or from receiving 
vital organs taken from living, healthy people. But those benefits 
                                               
 
1 Peter Singer’s One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Yale, 2002) 
provides information and arguments for the conclusion that we are 
morally obligated to assist people in absolute poverty. See also his The 
Life You Can Save and more recent books on absolute poverty: 
http://www.thelifeyoucansave.org  
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do not automatically justify directing so much money toward them 
(at the expense of others) or killing innocent people to take those 
organs.  
To assume something different about animal cases – i.e., that 
it is morally permissible to seriously harm animals to benefit 
humans – just assumes that animal experimentation is permissible: it 
does not give any reasons in favor of that. As we saw above, 
common claims about rights, importance, and moral status do not 
justify this assumption, but perhaps arguments discussed below 
will help justify it.  
 
“Necessity” Arguments 
 
Related to the argument from benefits is the argument from 
“necessity” or the claim that animal experiments are “essential”: 
“animal experiments are ‘necessary’; therefore, they are morally 
permissible.” To evaluate this argument, we must first ask what is 
meant by “necessary”? There is a sense of the term on which 
animal experimentation clearly is necessary: to do experiments on 
animals, it is necessary to do experiments on animals. This is true 
because to do any exact, particular action, it is necessary to do that 
action. Whatever is truly meant by “necessity,” an advocate of 
these arguments assumes a moral premise like the following: 
 
If doing some action is “necessary,” then it is morally 
permissible.  
 
For some meanings of “necessity” animal experimentation 
advocates attach to that claim, it will likely be false to say that all, 
or even much, animal experimentation is “necessary.” For these 
meanings, this moral principle will have no application.   
There are other meanings of “necessary,” e.g., that to say 
something is “necessary” could be to say that, “it couldn’t be 
achieved in any other way.” On this meaning, many animal 
experiments are “necessary.” But, on this meaning, some human 
vivisection is also “necessary” since some benefits from it also 
“cannot be achieved in any other way.” The principle above 
implies such vivisection is not wrong, but it is, so the above 
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principle is arguably false.  
 
“No Alternatives” Arguments 
 
The same critical observations can be given about arguments from 
there allegedly being “no alternatives” to animal experimentation: 
that’s likely false and that doesn’t seem to automatically make 
doing something morally permissible either.  
 
“Painless” and “Humane” Killing, Again 
 
In the context of experimentation, we also hear the “if the animals 
are killed painlessly, then that’s morally OK” assumption. Again, 
we should notice that we reject it about ourselves. In most cases, if 
we were killed, even “painlessly,” we would be deprived of our 
(hopefully valuable) futures: everything we would have 
experienced is taken from us. Insofar as animals have futures, and 
killing them prevents them from experiencing those futures (and 
any of the good experiences they would have had), it seems that 
the same basic reasons why it is wrong to kill us apply to many 
animals. So the assumption that “painless killing is automatically 
morally permissible” should be, at least, strongly doubted: good 
reasons would need to be given its favor.  
 
Logic and Keeping Cool 
 
While animal ethics, especially about animal experimentation and 
related issues, can be a heated topic, logic can help keep you cool. 
Find conclusions, ask for reasons, and demand a fair and impartial 
evaluation of those reasons. Keep the ethics and the science 
straight, and remember that scientific results have moral 
implications only in light of moral principles. By taking this course, 
you have more “ethics training” than nearly all scientists who 
defend animal use, so make use of your skills! 
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Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them whether it’s 
morally permissible (or even morally obligatory) to 
experiment on animals and why. What are some of the most 
common answers that would be given? What reasons would 
you often hear in favor of these answers? Are these reasons 
generally good reasons or not? Why? 
2. Describe how animals are treated by in medical, scientific, 
psychological, educational and industrial experimentation 
and research: what happens to animals when used for these 
purposes? What are the facts? How do these industries 
describe how they treat animals? Are they correct in their 
description of the facts?  
3. Explain the strongest moral arguments for the conclusions 
that animal experimentation is (nearly always) wrong and/or 
that an experiment on an animal is wrong unless the 
experimenters would be willing to perform the experiment 
on a similarly conscious and sentient human infant. Are 
these arguments sound or not? Explain and defend your 
views. 
4. Summarize the wide range of activities and methods of 
research that can be (and is) done to improve human 
health and cure disease that does not involve animals.  
5. Explain the strongest and/or most common moral 
arguments for the conclusions that (a) animal 
experimentation is almost never wrong, indeed it’s often 
morally obligatory and/or (b) animal experimentation is 
morally justified when it is “necessary” because there are 
“no alternatives” to produce the desired benefits.  Are 
these arguments sound or not? Explain and defend your 
views.  
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
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readings and issues. 
 
Paper option 
 
What, if any, kind of medical, scientific, psychological, 
commercial/industrial, educational and/or veterinary 
experimentation or research (and other uses, e.g., dissections) are 
morally permissible? Which are morally impermissible? 
Thoroughly defend your view and respond to the strongest and/or 
most common objections to your arguments. 4-6 pages.  
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CHAPTER 7: PETS / COMPANION ANIMALS; ZOOS, 
HUNTING, RACING, AND OTHER USES OF ANIMALS 
 
Overview 
 
This chapter we will discuss the moral responsibilities involved in 
keeping pets or companion animals and related moral issues 
concerning shelters, adoption, and killing unwanted companion 
animals. We will also discuss the arguments for and against 
hunting, dog and horse racing, rodeos, zoos and related uses of 
animals: is using animals for any or all of these purposes morally 
permissible or not? Why or why not?  
 
Readings 
 
EMPTY CAGES – 8. Turning Animals into Performers  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 7. Zoos 
 
EMPTY CAGES – 9. Turning Animals into Competitors  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 8. Hunting 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 9. Pets 
 
Gruen: 5. Dilemmas of captivity and 6. Animals in the wild 
(optional) 
 
Keith Burgess-Jackson, "Doing Right by Our Animal 
Companions" in David Benatar, ed., Ethics for Everyday 
(McGraw-Hill, 2002), 
http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/kbj-pets.pdf  
 
Gary Varner, "Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated 
Partners," in David Benatar, ed., Ethics for Everyday (McGraw-
Hill, 2002), pp. 150-75 
http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~gary/Publications/ using 
"guest" and "enter" when prompted for an ID and a 
password, respectively.  
68 
 
 
Further Reading:  
 
• Association of Zoos and Aquariums: 
http://www.aza.org/ 
• Ringling Brothers’ circus:  
http://www.ringling.com/animals/   
• Search these animal groups’ pages about these issues: 
HSUS: http://www.hsus.org/ 
(http://www.hsus.org/wildlife/issues_facing_wildlife/
circuses/), PETA: http://www.peta.org/ 
(www.circuses.com)  
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“Pets” & Pet “Ownership” vs. Companion Animals & 
Animal Guardians 
 
Keeping animals as companions raises unique responsibilities. 
Unlike many other ethical issues involving animals where our 
moral obligations are arguably largely “negative” – to not harm 
them, to leave them alone, etc. – we arguably have “positive” 
obligations towards any companion animals we might bring into 
our homes, e.g., to provide them with food, shelter, medical care, 
and companionship. This, of course, takes time, effort and money, 
sometimes a lot of money.  
These financial demands can be a burden and give rise to hard 
questions about the extent of our obligations to animals. After all, 
there is no health insurance for animals, and animals’ healthcare 
costs could create great financial strain. What should be done in 
these common situations? Go into debt to pay for the medical 
bills? Find someone else to take the animal who can pay? Have the 
animal killed? Something else? The answers might not be morally 
or financially easy.  
 Many critics of animal advocates often say things like, “Animal 
rights advocates oppose having pets.” This claim seems to be a 
result either of ignorance or intentional manipulation. First, many 
animal advocates, including philosophers, have companion 
animals and often mention these animals in their writings. So it is 
ignorant to claim that animals advocates oppose having animals as 
companions.  
 Many animal advocates, however, do oppose companion 
animal ownership and, perhaps, the use of the word “pet” if it 
implies ownership. This is because if you own something, then 
that something is your property. And (generally, with some 
exceptions), if something is your property, then (generally, with 
some exceptions) you can do whatever you want with it, including 
destroy (or kill) it for whatever reason you would like, or no 
reason at all. Thus, the objection is that in thinking of companion 
animals as pets and thereby owned property, that nearly implies 
that animals’ interests deserve no consideration in their own right 
and so on. Animal advocates, of course, reject that. And they 
argue that breeding companion animals is wrong because for every 
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“new” animal produced another already existing animal in a shelter 
will not be adopted and thus killed. But they also believe that 
animals, such as cats and dogs, can be kept as companions, 
provided they are well cared for. 
 These are some common views about companion animals held 
by many animal advocates. Given that this is what they believe, 
why do critics of animal advocacy so often say that animal 
advocates oppose keeping companion animals?  
 
Ends and Means 
 
Like many uses of animals, using animals in rodeos, circuses, zoos, 
racing, in hunting, etc. are often justified by appealing to various 
“ends” or “products” of the use. For these kinds of arguments 
(for both these issues, as well as when this kind of argument is 
used to defend eating animals, or experimenting on them, and so 
on), here are some questions to ask: 
• Is this a morally justified end, i.e., some worthy goal? 
o E.g., zoos might be justified by the claim that they 
are supposed to result in greater respect for animals, 
arguably a laudable goal. Rodeos might be justified 
by the claim that they produce entertainment for people, 
surely a more controversial goal. Some hunters 
might claim that the goal of hunting is to bring about 
the human pleasures resulting from killing animals, 
arguably a goal that could not be morally justified.  
• Is this use of animals an effective, or the most effective, 
means toward that goal?  
o E.g., with zoos, scientific research might show that 
zoo attendance results in no greater respect for 
animals, and perhaps increased disrespect for 
animals. Thus, perhaps zoos are not an effective 
means toward that end. Regarding hunting, yes, 
killing animals is indeed the most effective means to 
getting the pleasures that people claim to get from 
killing animals (but perhaps video games could have 
similar results?).  
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• Or are there other, better, ways to achieve this goal? 
o E.g., regarding zoos, surely there are better ways to 
teach respect for animals. Regarding rodeos, there 
are other ways to produce entertainment for 
humans and, arguably, ways that don’t produce 
harm for animals (or humans) surely are morally 
better than those that depend on harm. 
• Finally, what exactly are the best reasons to think that using 
animals for such an end is morally justified, especially in cases 
where animals are harmed greatly (and we would never 
dream of using human beings for such a purpose)? Are 
these reasons any good, i.e., sound arguments for the 
conclusion that this activity is morally permissible? And 
what exactly are the best reasons to think that using animals 
for such an end is morally unjustified, especially in cases 
where animals are harmed greatly (and we would never 
dream of using human beings for such a purpose)? 
 
These sorts of questions above are applicable to all questions 
about animal use.  
 
Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them about the 
morality of the various uses of animals in this unit. What 
are some of the most common answers that would be 
given? What reasons would you often hear in favor of these 
answers? Are these reasons generally good reasons or not? 
Why? 
2. While some critics of animal advocates claim that animal 
advocates oppose keeping “pets” or companion animals, 
they are clearly mistaken and ignorant of what animal 
advocates think. Nevertheless, what ethical issues and 
responsibilities are raised by keeping pets or companion 
animals? Are any issues genuinely challenging? Morally, 
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how should we respond to these issues? 
3. Describe how animals are treated by the various industries 
discussed in this unit and used in these various ways: what 
happens to animals when used for these purposes? What 
are the facts? How do these industries and practitioners 
describe how they treat animals? Are they correct in their 
description of the facts?  
4. Explain the strongest moral arguments in favor of using 
animals for entertainment, for zoos, for hunting, and/or 
any other uses from this section. Are these arguments 
sound or not? Explain and defend your views.  
5. Explain the strongest moral arguments against using 
animals for entertainment, for zoos, for hunting, and/or 
any other uses from this section. Are these arguments 
sound or not? Explain and defend your views.   
 
Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
 
Paper option 
 
Write a 4-6-page argumentative essay that explains and addresses 
the ethical issues raised by at least one of the uses of animals 
discussed in the readings this Chapter, defend a moral conclusion 
about that issue, and respond to the strongest and/or most 
common objections to your arguments.  
  
 
  
73 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: ACTIVISM FOR ANIMALS 
 
Overview 
 
What, if any, kinds of actions done to try to improve the treatment 
of animals (including, perhaps, trying to eliminate various uses of 
animals) are morally permissible? Which, if any, are morally 
obligatory? Changing our diets? Educating others? Working for 
larger cages and more humane treatment, or for the abolishment 
of (some) animal use industries, or both? Trying to change the laws 
to better protect animals? Illegal actions (done covertly or openly)? 
Undercover investigations to reveal animal abuse? Rescuing or 
releasing animals from animal use industries? Exposing people and 
businesses who support harmful animal use? Violence of any kind, 
ever? Threats of violence? Terrorism? We will explore a range of 
tactics and attempt to evaluate them morally.  
 
Readings  
 
EMPTY CAGES – PART V – MANY HANDS ON MANY 
OARS  
EMPTY CAGES –  11. "Yes . . . but . . ."  
EMPTY CAGES – EPILOGUE – The Cat  
 
ANIMAL LIBERATION – 6. Speciesism Today . . . defenses, 
rationalizations, and objections to Animal Liberation and the 
progress made in overcoming them  Also re-read the 2002 
Preface to Animal Liberation.  
 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 10. Animal Rights Activism 
ANIMALS LIKE US – Ch. 11. What Goes Around Comes 
Around 
 
Gruen: 7. Protecting animals. (optional) 
 
Matt Ball, Vegan Outreach, “Working in Defense of Animals” 
http://www.veganoutreach.org/enewsletter/20030105.html  
Vegan Outreach “Adopt a College” Program: 
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http://www.veganhealth.org/colleges/  
 
Bruce Friedrich (PETA), “Effective Advocacy: Stealing from 
the Corporate Playbook” 
http://www.goveg.com/effectiveAdvocacy.asp  
 
Karen Dawn, about Dawnwatch: 
http://dawnwatch.com/introduction.htm  
 
James LaVeck (Tribe of Heart film production company), 
“Invasion of the Movement Snatchers: A Social Justice Cause 
Falls Prey to the Doctrine of “Necessary Evil” 
http://www.tribeofheart.org/tohhtml/essay_ims.htm (see his 
other essays as well) 
Gary Francione, “The Abolition of Animal Exploitation: The 
Journey Will Not Begin While We Are Walking Backwards,” 
http://www.abolitionist-online.com/article-
issue05_gary.francione_abolition.of.animal.exploitation.2006.s
html  
 
The Center for Consumer Freedom: http://www.activistcash.com/ 
& http://www.consumerfreedom.com/  
SourceWatch on the Activist Cash page 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=A_visit_to_the
_ActivistCash.com_web_site and the Center for Consumer 
Freedom: 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Center_for_Co
nsumer_Freedom  
 
Wikipedia entry on the Animal Liberation Front: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_Liberation_Front  
 
Recommended Reading:  
• Peter Singer, ed. In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave 
(Blackwell) 
• Steve Best, ed., Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections 
on the Liberation of Animals (Lantern). 
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Criticisms or Complaints about (Some) Activists Have No 
Implications for the Morality of Animal Use 
 
Activists try to bring about change in others’ beliefs, attitudes and 
behavior. Naturally, since people tend to be resistant to change, 
people often do not like activists. This dislike sometimes leads to 
bad arguments.  
 When people are unhappy with activists and what they do, they 
sometimes seem to think that this has some bearing on the 
morality of the actions that that the activist is concerned with. For 
example, you might hear someone say something like, “It’s OK to 
eat meat. After all, vegetarians are so pushy and self-righteous and 
‘in your face’ about it all.” Or, “Animal research is clearly a good 
thing. After all, animal rights activists are so obnoxious in their 
protests and some of them even break the law and try to 
intimidate scientists.” Activists – for animals and many other 
issues – often get called a lot of bad names and are thought poorly 
of.  
 These responses, while unfortunately common, are extremely 
poor, if they are given to try to show that some use of animals is, 
contrary to what the activist argues, morally permissible. This is 
because no moral evaluation of actions follows from evaluations 
about people. Think about the abortion controversy. Suppose 
someone said, “Some anti-abortionists threaten and even murder 
abortion providers; these activists are bad people.” If they then 
said, “Therefore, we should think that abortion is morally OK,” the 
conclusion simply doesn’t follow. And it never follows elsewhere: 
whether an action is morally permissible or not is not determined 
by any activists’ behavior, good or bad. The issues are separate and 
logically distinct.  
  “Smear campaigns” against activists are also typically based on 
false generalizations about activists. Yes, some animal activists are 
rude, obnoxious or whatever, but surely some animal use advocates 
are also rude, obnoxious or whatever. And some animal advocates 
are also quite nice, friendly and respectful, as are some advocates 
of animal use (at least to human beings). But we must keep in 
mind that none of this has any bearing on the moral status of any 
animal use.  
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“Welfarism” & “Welfarists” versus “Animal Rights” & 
“Abolitionists”: Ends and Means 
 
A current heated controversy among animal advocates is whether 
they should be – as some describe it – either advocates of “animal 
welfare” and “welfare reforms,” or advocates for “animal rights” 
and the “abolition” of harmful animal use or both. These terms are 
often ill-defined and not carefully thought through. This can lead 
to needless conflict among animal advocates and an inability to 
understand what kind of information might help resolve these 
debates. Thinking about “ends” or “goals” and “means” or 
“strategies” can help us understand these distinctions and better 
assess (and perhaps overcome) this debate amongst activists.  
First, ends: what would be a morally acceptable end goal for the 
treatment of animals? What kind of world would we have if all 
animals were treated in morally permissible ways, where we could 
say, “We have achieved the moral goal for how animals ought to 
be treated since none are treated wrongly anymore?”  
Regan’s cat case presents two broad options – among many – for 
such a goal: 
 
C. Seriously harming animals is permissible provided they 
are housed in comfortable cages, treated gently and 
killed painlessly.  
D. Seriously harming animals is typically morally wrong, 
even if they are housed in comfortable cages, treated 
gently and killed painlessly.  
 
Anyone who claims (C) is an acceptable goal or end we can call a 
“welfarist”: they believe that once certain kinds of harms to animals 
are minimized or eliminated, it is still usually morally permissible 
to seriously harm animals, e.g., by killing them. Their view might 
vary depending on the purposes behind these harms, of course. 
And there are important details, e.g., about which harms are 
permissible to cause and which aren’t, that they would need to 
explain so we fully understand the view. And, most importantly, 
whether any arguments in favor of welfarism are sound and 
withstand objections is something we would want to think about 
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very carefully.1  
 Anyone who believes that (C) is deficient for an ideal goal and 
that (D) is that ideal we might call a “genuine” animal rights 
advocate. Or, so that we say what we really mean, we could just 
say they believe that seriously harming animals is typically morally wrong, 
even if they are housed in comfortable cages, treated gently and killed 
painlessly. We would want to understand their reasons for why they 
think that, and whether any arguments in favor of this kind of 
view are sound and withstand critical scrutiny is something we 
would also want to think about very carefully. 
 Beyond the question of acceptable or ideal final goals or ends 
for animals is the question of “means”: what sort of actions, 
policies, strategies, campaigns, and other activist activities will be 
the most effective means toward the desired end goal for animals? 
In particular, if the goal is (D), the “animal rights” end, what 
should be done now to best achieve this, or get us closest to it, as 
soon as possible? 
 Here is where the debate begins. Should we now campaign for 
larger cages, and, once successful with that, then campaign for “no 
cages” – i.e., argue that animals shouldn’t be used in the first 
place? (Or should some activists do the former and other activists 
the latter?) The former might lead to some small improvements 
now (or it might not), but it also might forestall or prevent greater 
improvements that might have occurred had the focus been on 
“empty cages.” On the other hand, campaigns for “empty cages” 
might fall on too many deaf ears and yield no short term 
                                               
 
1 Some might observe that, in practice, those who call themselves 
“welfarists” or “advocates of animal welfare” typically accept just 
about any use of animals, i.e., they deem just about all harmful uses 
of animals as “necessary” and/or respecting “animal welfare.” This 
may be true, but it doesn’t show that welfarism is false. This may, 
however, suggest that there really is no clearly defined view 
“welfarism”: it’s just some words that people use but the view really 
has no implications for animal use because we can’t pin it down in 
any rigorous way. See Gary Francione’s writings for discussion 
(Google). 
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improvements. But perhaps enough ears eventually will hear the 
message and this will result in widespread abolition of animal use, 
perhaps incrementally, one industry or sub-industry after another. 
Or maybe not.  
 These debates are often divisive, but it’s not clear that they 
should be. For one, they often involve matters that are largely 
speculative, such as the long-term effects of some campaign 
strategy (as compared to another). Here we are dealing with little 
knowledge and hard data; we are often left with guesswork, hopes 
and under-informed estimations. This ignorance should result in 
greater humility and less dogmatism on this topic, and a call for 
formal training in areas that might bring in some useful information 
to help us answer these questions about means, such as 
economics, marketing, consumer psychology, statistics and so 
forth. We should agree that we don’t know what we need to know 
to bring about our desired end, and turn our focus towards gaining 
that knowledge.  
 A second reason why these debates shouldn’t be divisive is 
that it is not clear that they are philosophical ones. As suggested 
above, they are largely empirical and scientific. Our ends do not 
obviously dictate our means. Suppose we lived a few hundred 
years ago, came to believe that slavery was wrong and should be 
abolished, not merely made more “humane.” We have set our ends, 
but what means should we use to achieve that end ASAP? Back 
then, there was no obvious answer, for reasons comparable to 
those mentioned about. These issues were debated then (and are 
still debated now, since human slavery still exists) and animal 
advocates can surely learn from studying that debate.  
 
Animal Advocates Promoting Animal Use? 
 
As a concrete example of the issue above, some animal advocacy 
organizations have recently begun giving a “platform” for animal-
use industries, especially those who practice so-called “humane” 
farming. Whether this is an effective (or dismal) strategic means to 
help bring about an “animal rights” end, or whether this should be 
seen as a statement that the morally acceptable end really is 
“welfarism” is something that many activists have begun debating.  
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Illegal Actions 
 
Let us now turn to some more controversial forms of activism. 
Consider “open rescues” of animals from farms: these typically 
involve trespass, breaking and entering, and theft of animals that are 
somebody’s property. All these actions are illegal. Some people argue 
that such rescues are morally wrong because they are illegal. They might 
argue similarly against any form of activism that involves illegal 
activity.  
These are unsound arguments and nearly everyone agrees with 
that because nearly everyone believes that this unstated premise, 
which is essential to the argument, is false: 
 
Necessarily, if an action is illegal, then it is morally 
impermissible.  
 
Hiding Jews from Nazi’s was illegal, yet morally permissible; 
helping slaves escape to freedom was illegal, yet morally 
permissible. Many more examples make the same point. Contrary 
to a common reaction, these examples do not make any 
“comparisons” whatsoever between animal issues and slavery or 
human holocausts1; they are simply used to show that any (or just 
about any) argument against some kind of activism based on the 
premise that it is illegal is unsound (or, at least, just about 
everyone’s beliefs entail that it is unsound, since they think the 
above premise is false: just because something is illegal does not 
necessarily entail that it is morally wrong). Animal advocates are 
advised to read Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 1963 “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail.”2 They will find much to resonate with Dr. 
King’s discussion.  
                                               
 
1 For an insightful discussion of such comparisons, see Karen Davis’s 
The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale: A Case for Comparing Atrocities 
(Lantern, 2005). http://www.upc-online.org/  
2 Widely reposted online; 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/birmingham.p
df   
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Violent Actions 
 
More controversial forms of activism involve violence or threats 
of violence of different kinds. Violence comes in many different 
forms, as our authors observe. 
Some animal advocates, e.g., some members of the ALF 
(Animal Liberation Front), engage in property destruction (e.g., of 
animal cages, computers with experimental data, etc.) and even 
sometimes even arson. Although they claim that their actions are 
“non-violent,” this strains the concept of violence. They argue that 
since they are not violent to anyone, i.e., they do not inflict bodily 
harm on anyone, they thereby act non-violently.  
This inference does not follow: one can act violently yet do no 
violence to anyone. For example, it seems to make perfect sense to 
say that someone could violently smash carton of fruits and 
vegetables with a sledgehammer, especially if the person was in a 
heated frenzy. One might not want young children to see such a 
spectacle because, well, it’s too violent! So the ALF’s insistence 
that they are always non-violent strains the meaning of the term.  
Perhaps they (and animal use industries) want to insist that they 
are non-violent because they think this principle is true: 
 
All acts of violence are morally impermissible.   
 
If this were true, and they acted violently (in performing arson, or 
in how they treat animals, for example), that would imply that they 
were acting wrongly.  
But the above principle is false, according to most people: 
violence can be, and often is, morally justified. If violence (or 
threats of violence) are needed for self-defense, then it’s 
permissible. If it’s needed to defend an innocent third party, then 
it’s justified. Perhaps some wars can be justified. So the above 
principle is false, according to most people.  
Most people might even think that it’s false regarding some 
animals too: if someone tried to attack your dog or cat, might you 
be morally justified in responding with violence, or threats of 
violence, to defend your companion animal if needed? What if the 
animal was a stray? What if the animal was in a farm, 
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slaughterhouse or lab? If they knew the details of the case, perhaps 
many people might think that violence, if needed for defending 
animals, would be morally permissible in at least some of these 
cases. 
So perhaps violence could be justified in cases of rescue. 
Whether violence can ever be justified for any other purposes, e.g., 
in an attempt to change society’s general views about our 
obligations to animals, seems extremely doubtful. In fact, given all 
the relevant considerations, it is likely that any such violence, 
including possible genuine “terrorism,” would be deeply morally 
wrong, for reasons that Regan, Singer and Rowlands articulate.  
 
Discussion Questions 
 
1. For many ethical issues, a good place to start is to reflect 
on “common views” about the issues. Suppose you 
surveyed a range of people and asked them what kinds of 
animal advocacy (if any) is good, effective and/or 
acceptable, and what kinds (if any) are bad, ineffective 
and/or unacceptable. What are some of the most common 
answers that would be given? What reasons would you often 
hear in favor of these answers? Are these reasons generally 
good reasons or not? Why? 
2. Describe the range of options for activism for animals. 
Explain which you think are most effective or useful (for 
what?), the least effective or useful (for what?) and why.  
3. Obviously, animal use industries are critical of animal 
activists. Describe their responses to activists, their 
“counter-activism” and your moral evaluation of their 
tactics.  
4. Is any illegal activity (e.g., “open-rescues”) for animals ever 
moral justified? When and why, or why not? Is violence, of 
any kind, ever morally justified? When and why, or why 
not? 
5. What kind of activism, if any, should you personally be 
engaged in? Is this a moral obligation? Why should you do 
this kind activism rather than another? Justify your choices 
with reasons.  
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Of course, always feel free to raise any other questions, 
observations, criticisms and any other responses to the Chapter’s 
readings and issues. 
 
Paper option 
 
A paper on activism: what kinds of activism (if any) are 
permissible? What (if any) are obligatory? What (if any) are wrong?   
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RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING: 
 
Overviews of Animals & Ethics  
1. Susan Armstrong & Richard Botzler, eds. The Animal Ethics 
Reader, 2nd Ed. (Routledge, 2003, 2008) is the only 
comprehensive anthology of ethics & animals writings 
currently available. It is less than ideal, however, because 
the pro-animal theoretical selections are perhaps not ideal 
(e.g., the selections from Singer and Regan are not the best 
available; the selections from other pro-animal ethical 
theoreticians are a bit idiosyncratic); there are few 
criticisms of pro-animal moral theorizing, little anti-animal 
ethical theorizing, and few defenses of particular animal 
uses; furthermore, the selection on animal experimentation 
is sparse. The strengths seem to be in the areas of wildlife 
and environmental issues, as those seem to be the editors’ 
specialties.  
2. Tom Regan and Carl Cohen, The Animal Rights Debate 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2001) and Tom Regan, Animal 
Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) (which is mostly The Animal 
Rights Debate minus Cohen’s contribution) are great 
introductions: the latter argues for moral rights for animals 
(and humans) by examining competing moral theories. 
Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (University of California, 
1983/2004) was recently reissued as a 20th anniversary 
edition with an updated preface containing replies to 
critics. 
3. Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and 
Human Obligations, 2nd ed. (Prentice Hall, 1989). An 
excellent collection, despite its age, but is very expensive ($75 
new, but much cheaper used).  
4. Bernard Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality, 3rd Ed. 
(Prometheus, 2006, 1998, 1981). Rollin is a philosopher 
who has interacted with tens of thousands of people 
employed in animal agribusiness and experimentation and 
so has a unique and valuable perspective on the issues. His 
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book is written in a personal style, with many anecdotes 
about his experiences.   
5. Angus Taylor, Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the 
Philosophical Debate, 3rd edition (Broadview 2009).  A nice 
overview of the literature. (On Amazon.) 
6. Clare Palmer, “Animals in Anglo-American Philosophy” 
http://www.h-net.org/~animal/ruminations_palmer.html 
7. Scott Wilson, “Animals and Ethics,” The Internet Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy  http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anim-eth.htm  
8. Lori Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/  
 
On argument analysis 
9. Richard Feldman’s (University of Rochester, Philosophy) 
Reason and Argument text, 2nd Ed. (Prentice Hall, 1998  
10. Nathan Nobis & Scott McElreath, Making Moral Progress: 
An Ethical Arguments Workbook, 
www.MakingMoralProgress.com (in progress) 
 
On ethics 
11. James Fieser, “Ethics,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(sections 2 and 3, on Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics 
are most relevant):  http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/ethics.htm  
 
On Animal Minds / Cognitive Ethology 
12. Colin Allen (http://mypage.iu.edu/~colallen/), “Animal 
Consciousness,” entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/ 
13. Jonathan Balcombe, Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and The 
Nature of Feeling Good (MacMillan 2006) 
http://www.pleasurablekingdom.com/  
14. Marc Bekoff’s web page and books: 
http://literati.net/Bekoff/  
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BONUS ESSAY 1: ABORTION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
DOES EITHER TOPIC LEAD TO THE OTHER?
1
 
  
Should your views on abortion influence your views on animal rights? Should 
your views on the moral status of animals influence your views on the moral 
status of human fetuses?  
        Generally, no. Most arguments against abortion have no implications for 
animal rights and those that might seem to be poor arguments against 
abortion. And arguments for animal rights only have implications for rare, 
later abortions of conscious fetuses, not the majority of abortions that affect 
early, pre-conscious fetuses.  
On the other sides, though, a common of objection to animal rights does 
support a pro-life view and an influential feminist pro-choice argument does 
suggest positive implications for animals, though.  
Overall, the topic of abortion presents with an inherent complexity never 
analogously present in animal rights issues – the perspective of the pregnant 
woman whose life and body the fetus depends on – and so the issues are 
importantly distinct.  
 
Should people who believe in animal rights think that abortion is 
wrong? Should pro-lifers accept animal rights? If you think it’s 
wrong to kill fetuses to end pregnancies, should you also think it’s 
wrong to kill animals to, say, eat them? If you, say, oppose animal 
research, should you also oppose abortion? 
Some argue ‘yes’ and others argue ‘no’ to either or both sets of 
questions.[1] The correct answer, however, seems to be, ‘it 
depends’: it depends on why someone accepts animal rights, and 
why someone thinks abortion is wrong: it depends on their 
reasons. 
                                               
 
1 Originally published (7/16/16) at What's Wrong? The Blog of the 
University of Colorado, Boulder, Center for Values and Social Policy:  
https://whatswrongcvsp.com/2016/07/16/whats-wrong-with-
linking-abortion-and-animal-rights/  
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1. Animal Rights and Abortion Wrongs? 
On some reasons, there is a clear connection between the topics. 
If someone says abortion is wrong because fetuses are “living 
things,” or “organisms,” or “beings,” those reasons clearly 
apply to animals, since they too are living things, organisms and 
beings. If someone else says animals have (moral) rights because 
they are living, organisms or beings, those reasons apply to human 
fetuses: they are alive (abortion involves killing them, and you 
can’t kill non-living things), they are organisms (they are complex 
and developing) and they are beings (albeit dependent beings). 
These arguments connect the topics: one argument leads to 
comparable conclusions for the other. If you think fetuses have 
rights, for those reasons, you should be inclined to think the same 
about animal rights, and vice versa. 
These arguments are no good though. They both assume the 
premise that all living things, organisms and/or beings are wrong to kill. 
And that’s not true. Plants, mold, bacteria and many insects, like 
mosquitoes and gnats are not wrong to kill, at least. 
 
These types of things aren’t even what’s called “prima facie” 
wrong to kill, meaning something like, “Wrong to kill unless there 
is a very good reason to kill it.” We, readers of this essay, are prima 
facie wrong to kill: if someone kills us, that’s wrong unless there’s a 
really good reason that justifies it. You don’t need a really good 
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reason to kill a weed or a carrot, or some mold in your shower or a 
mosquito flying by. 
So, these arguments connect the issues, but aren’t good arguments 
about either: one didn’t provide good reason to think that animals 
have rights, and the other doesn’t provide good reason to think 
that abortion is wrong. 
2. Abortion Wrongs and Animal Rights? 
Let’s consider some other arguments to seek a connection. 
Let’s start with abortion and see what might lead us to animal 
rights. Considering why abortion might be prima facie wrong is 
useful since most people who claim that abortion is wrong deny 
that is absolutely or necessarily wrong: they acknowledge some cases 
where it is not wrong: to save the life of the pregnant woman and 
perhaps rape, at least. So even people who call themselves “pro-
life” typically think abortion is prima facie wrong. But why? And 
what might their reasons suggest for whether animals have rights? 
Abortion is sometimes said to be prima facie wrong simply 
because fetuses are human. If ‘human’ means, biologically 
human then that argument just isn’t going to apply to non-human 
animals, whether it’s a good argument against abortion or not. 
And it’s not: random biologically human cells and tissues are not 
even prima facie wrong to kill either: it wouldn’t be wrong to kill a 
smear of living human cheek cells cultivated in a petri dish, for 
example. 
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A more sophisticated argument is that abortion is prima facie 
wrong because fetuses are biologically human organisms: they 
are not random clumps of cells, but special cells that can develop 
into someone much like us (and so, some argue, they are someone 
like us now). Another argument is that abortion is prima facie 
wrong because fetuses are the “kind” of being that is a rational 
moral agent: a feline or bovine fetus, in contrast, is not that 
“kind” of being. 
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Deciding whether these arguments are good or not requires some 
careful thinking. We can avoid that for now since these arguments 
don’t connect the topics: non-human animals are not biologically 
human organisms and they likely are not rational moral agents or 
that “kind” of being. No argument that restricts serious moral 
concern only to humans or their unique abilities will connect to 
non-humans. 
Another argument begins with the safe assumption that it is wrong 
to kill and act violently towards innocent and vulnerable beings. 
Since fetuses are innocent and vulnerable, killing them by abortion 
is wrong, so some argue. 
This argument seems to apply to many animals, who are clearly 
innocent and vulnerable. Farm animals fearfully trying to escape 
from workers trying to kill them are clearly vulnerable beings: they 
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are vulnerable to all sorts of physical and emotional harms. If this 
argument inclines anyone to think that the abuse of vulnerable and 
innocent animals is wrong and should stop, more power to it. 
(Some “pro-lifers” might resist though, claiming that their serious 
moral concern is only for innocent and vulnerable human life, not 
any and all innocent and vulnerable lives, not all victims of 
violence. We must ask what, if anything, might justify this 
speciesist prejudice, and that might be a long conversation, and we 
might conclude that this is an unjustified prejudice. But, we should 
notice that this new argument about abortion – now only 
concerning innocent, vulnerable humans – no longer has 
implications for non-human animals: it doesn’t connect the 
topics.) 
While it is true that innocent and vulnerable beings should be 
protected – that’s a moral near-certainty – are fetuses really 
innocent and vulnerable, despite what people often say? 
“Innocent” seems to mean something like “capable of 
intentionally doing wrong, but not doing wrong and so not 
deserving ill treatment.” But fetuses, especially early fetuses, aren’t 
capable of doing wrong, since they can’t intentionally do anything, 
especially anything with moral dimensions. Fetuses seem to be 
neither innocent nor not: the concept just doesn’t apply to them. 
(It’s doubtful that animals can be morally blameworthy, but they are 
often called ‘innocent’ when they haven’t done anything that’s 
dangerous to others: this suggests that being capable 
of doing things is necessary for ‘innocence’). 
Are fetuses “vulnerable”? Recall the image of animals in fear, 
trying to evade their killers. Imagine a child cowering in fear, 
covering her head to shield herself from blows from an abusive 
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parent. These are paradigm instances of the abuse of a vulnerable 
being: they reveal vulnerability. 
Are abortions like that? Are early abortions, of early fetuses, like 
that? More detailed information about the development of fetal 
consciousness and the potential for fetal pain will be given below, 
but at least early fetuses are not yet conscious and are not able to 
feel anything: their brains and nervous systems are not yet 
developed for that. Given what fetuses are like, at early stages, to 
call them “vulnerable” may be a stretch of the term: what are they 
vulnerable to? At least, they are very different from the clearly 
vulnerable animal or child examples above in that they physically 
and emotionally experience their abuse. Early fetuses don’t 
experience anything, yet. So, while animals can be described as 
innocent and vulnerable, it is unclear that those concepts apply to 
early fetuses. 
Some argue that fetuses are persons (from conception?) and so 
abortion is prima facie wrong. While persons are prima facie wrong 
to kill, we need to ask what is meant by ‘person’. Some respond, 
‘human being,’ which is not going to lead anywhere for animal 
rights. More thoughtful answers recognize that there are, or could 
be, divine persons and extra-terrestrial persons: in science fiction, 
humans interact with friendly and intelligent extra-terrestrials as 
their moral equals (as they would be). And a human body can 
remain biologically alive but the person gone: this is why being 
alive in a permanent coma is not much better than being dead, if 
that individual’s consciousness will never return. 
What are persons, then, on this account? Roughly, beings with 
personalities: conscious, feeling beings with abilities to perceive, 
reason (in some manner and at some level), have emotions, can 
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communicate, a sense of self and so on. The idea is that 
personhood is determined by one’s psychology and so personhood 
could, and perhaps does, emerge in bodies that are not human: if 
there is a God, personhood occurs in a being without a body at all. 
This definition of personhood arguably applies to many animals: 
they have thoughts, feelings, memories, anticipations and unique 
personalities tying all these psychological states and abilities 
together. Are cats and dogs and cows and pigs more “like us,” as 
persons, or are they more like carrots or rocks, clearly non-
persons? If “like us,” then perhaps they are closer to being persons 
than many suspected. 
Whether this theory of personhood applies to fetuses, whether and 
when they are persons, depends on what they are like in terms of 
their cognitive, mental or psychological development. Here is 
some relevant information: 
▪ Fetal consciousness and pain: Most medical and scientific 
research finds that, at the earliest, fetuses likely become 
conscious and develop an ability to feel pain around the end 
of the second or beginning of the third trimester of 
pregnancy. (See also here, among many other sources). At 
least one philosopher, Cheryl Abbate, however, has argued 
that, to give fetuses every benefit of the doubt (such as the 
doubts given to think that some invertebrate animals feel 
pain), fetuses might become conscious and able to feel pain 
at around 8 weeks.[2] 
▪ When Abortions Occur: The CDC reports: “In 2012, the 
majority (65.8%) of abortions were performed by ≤8 weeks’ 
gestation, and nearly all (91.4%) were performed by ≤13 
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weeks’ gestation. Few abortions (7.2%) were performed 
between 14–20 weeks’ gestation or at ≥21 weeks’ gestation 
(1.3%).” 
 
Source: Brad Smith 
at http://embryo.soad.umich.edu/carnStages/carnStages.html  
There is room for informed empirical debate these issues, and the 
CDC numbers are limited to the United States. But this 
information suggests that most aborted fetuses are, fortunately, 
not conscious and can’t feel anything and that these fetuses are 
not persons, on a psychological definition. Early abortions 
involve killing biologically human beings, but not human 
persons: potential persons (discussed below), yes; human 
organisms, yes; beings of the “kind” rational moral agent, yes: 
but recall that these arguments don’t apply to animals. 
(Another view is that persons are intrinsically valuable beings. 
This is a fine answer, but we must ask who or what has that type 
of value and why – what makes a being have that type of value – 
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and that takes us back to the answers we are discussing here). 
If fetuses aren’t persons, they are potential persons, and that 
makes abortion wrong, some argue. Insofar as most animals 
whose rights in question are, arguably, already actual persons – on 
the psychological definition of personhood – that would imply 
that they are not potential persons: if you are actually something, 
you aren’t potentially that same thing. So any proposal for how 
potential persons should be treated won’t apply to actual persons: 
again, there’s no connection. (The other premise of the argument 
though, that potential persons have the rights of actual persons, such as the 
right to life, is doubtful since potential beings [potential doctors, 
lawyers, presidents, parents, adults, spouses, senior citizens, and 
on] never have the rights of actual beings of that kind, in virtue of 
that potential. Arguments against abortion from potential 
personhood are doubtful). 
Finally, some might respond that these above arguments evade the 
simple point that abortions seriously harm fetuses, and so abortions 
are wrong. Causing serious harms is prima facie wrong, and animals 
clearly can be (and are) harmed: the idea of cruelty to animals and 
calls for the “humane” treatment of animals presume that animals 
can be harmed, and that certain harms must be minimized. So this 
type of argument connects the issues. 
But are early, pre-conscious fetuses harmed when aborted? Some 
might quickly react that they are obviously are, since they are 
destroyed and killed. Thinking through the nature of “harm” 
though suggests perhaps otherwise. Think about all the ways you 
can be harmed: physically, emotionally, cognitively, financially, and 
more. In each case, you are always made worse off, in some 
important way, compared to how you were: something happened and 
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now, from your perspective, you are worse off. This suggests that 
to be harmed, one needs a perspective that can take a turn for the 
worse. But pre-conscious fetuses have no perspective: they are not 
aware of anything, yet. So, it seems that they cannot be made 
worse off, compared to how they were, since they never “were” in 
a conscious way. Later conscious and feeling fetuses can be 
harmed, but not early fetuses, it seems. 
In reply, it must be observed that abortion usually results in 
a future person not being born: because of an abortion, there is 
some future individual who does not exist. While that’s true, it is 
surely not wrong to not reproduce and contraception, including by 
abstinence, prevents the existence of future people. But we don’t 
usually think of that as harmful: who would it harm? Someone 
who doesn’t yet exist? Since it’s not wrong to not bring future 
people into the world, that abortion has this same result wouldn’t 
make it wrong either. 
To conclude, these are a few common arguments that abortion is 
wrong. Some of these arguments don’t connect to animal 
rights: human– and moral agent-based arguments, at least. 
Arguments from innocence and vulnerability and 
psychological personhood might support animal rights. But we 
saw that these may not be very strong arguments about abortion, 
at least early abortions, since these early fetuses might not really be 
innocent, or vulnerable or persons, given what they are like and 
the nature of these concepts. These doubtful arguments about 
abortion might support animal rights though, nevertheless. 
These are just a few arguments about abortion though, quickly 
discussed, and none of them were theological or religious-
based. Further arguments could, and should, be investigated to 
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seek connections from anti-abortion arguments to pro-animal 
arguments: maybe a strong argument would be found that 
connects the issues. 
3. Animal Rights? 
Now let’s go the other direction and consider some arguments 
about animal rights to see if they lead us to think that abortion is 
wrong. 
Cases for moral rights for animals or, more generally, views 
that it is wrong to seriously harm animals for food, 
experimentation, entertainment and other purposes – this this 
view can be stated without mentioning ‘rights’ – depend on the 
observation that many animals have minds: they are conscious, are 
aware, and can feel pain and can suffer. This is true of mammals 
and birds, likely all vertebrates (including fish) and perhaps some 
invertebrates also. These animals also have positive feelings: 
pleasure, happiness and other positive emotions. And they are not 
disconnected blips of consciousness: they are psychologically 
unified by memories, anticipations, knowledge, social relationships 
and distinct personalities. They are individuals: each is a someone 
not a something. 
Combine those facts about animals’ minds with many plausible 
moral theories or principles and we are on our way to an animal-
rights-like view. That theory might be utilitarian-related and 
concerned with the pleasures and pains of all beings who can 
experience such feelings, not just humans. Or it might be Kantian 
and emphasize treating all conscious beings as ends-in-
themselves, not just rational beings. Or it might, as a Golden 
Rule and John Rawls require, demand that we treat others in 
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ways we would be willing to be treated, seeing things from their 
perspectives as best we can. There are many moral-theoretical 
options to justify the belief that conscious animals have basic 
rights to avoiding pain and suffering, rights from other types of 
harms and, most importantly, rights to their own bodies and lives. 
4. Animal Rights and Early Fetuses’ Rights? 
Our purpose here isn’t to defend animal rights though. It’s to see 
what animal-rights arguments imply or suggest for human fetuses 
and abortion. Is there a connection? 
Not really. 
Animal rights principles apply to conscious, feeling beings – 
sentient beings – and early, first trimester fetuses are not that. 
According to the information above about fetal consciousness and 
when most abortions occur, most aborted fetuses are not yet 
conscious and so can’t feel anything. 
So should animal rights advocates oppose early abortions? Not for 
any plausible reasons they give to think that animals have rights, 
since those reasons just don’t apply to early fetuses. If someone 
thought that animals have rights because they are “life,” as we saw 
above, this implies that vegetables and plants and mold and 
bacteria have rights, a conclusion that animal advocates and 
anyone else sensibly rejects. So, if and when animal rights 
advocates are pro-life about early abortions, it wouldn’t be for 
animal-rights or, more generally, conscious-or-sentient-being-rights-
related reasons: it’d have to be another argument. 
Some mistakenly argue that animal rights arguments positively 
imply that fetuses lack rights. They offer this charge against animal 
rights advocates: 
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You think that if a being is conscious and feeling, then it has 
rights. But you say early fetuses are not conscious and feeling. 
So you must think that they don’t have rights. 
But this argument is logically invalid, “denying the antecedent,” 
just like this argument: 
You think that if Eve goes to State College, then Eve is a 
college student. But you know that Eve doesn’t go to State 
College. Therefore, you must think Eve is not a college 
student. 
Since Eve could attend a private college, that means the premises 
could be true but the conclusion false. So, these premises do not 
lead to the conclusion or justify it, and this pattern of reasoning is 
never good. 
In sum, plausible animal rights arguments don’t justify thinking 
that early fetuses have rights or, importantly, that they lack rights: 
they are neutral on the issue and so further arguments are needed 
to go either way on abortion, pro-choice or pro-life. 
5. Animal Rights and Later Fetuses’ Rights? 
Later abortions, affecting conscious and feeling fetuses, are a 
different issue, however. 
Obviously we don’t know what it’s like to be a fetus, but being 
killed in an abortion would surely feel horrific, to say the least. 
According to moral principles that motivate animal rights, causing 
this type of pain would surely be wrong unless done for a very 
good reason, and so animal rights-related thinking seems to reject 
any possible pro-choice views that claim that abortions are nearly 
necessarily morally permissible, that an abortion just could never 
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be morally wrong, even if done very late in pregnancy and for 
frivolous reasons. 
What might a good reason be to painfully abort a conscious, 
feeling fetus? At least, if this type of abortion was required to save 
the pregnant woman’s life or prevent other harms to her as bad or 
worse than the harms to the fetus from this type of abortion, then that 
would be a good reason, it seems. 
Fortunately, the numbers above suggest that relatively few 
abortions are of conscious, sentient fetuses: just a small 
percentage, perhaps a bit more if fetal consciousness develops 
earlier. These abortions are often performed because of serious 
disabilities found in the fetus: it is doubtful that women have later 
abortions for anything other than serious reasons. Regardless, the 
frequency of these later abortions could surely be reduced if early 
abortions were more readily available. 
What else might be a good reason to potentially justify a later term 
abortion? Or who else? 
Absent from our discussion so far has been the pregnant 
woman: she tends to be overlooked by anti-abortion arguments, 
which have been our focus. Obviously though, the fetus is 
developing in her body and will be making major demands on her 
and her body over pregnancy and birth. 
Would a fetus have a right to her body, especially if that fetus was 
conscious and feeling? Philosopher Judith Thompson, in her 
famous 1971 “A Defense of Abortion” article, observed that other 
people don’t rights to our bodies, even if they need our bodies to 
stay alive: you don’t have a right to my kidney, even if you need it 
to live, and I don’t violate your rights if you die because I don’t 
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give it to you. Fetuses, even if they were persons with the right to 
life, might not have a right to pregnant women’s bodies, and 
pregnant women have a right to not allow fetuses to use their 
bodies. This fact complicates later abortions and simplifies earlier 
ones: the emergence of fetal consciousness doesn’t make later 
abortions straightforwardly wrong, and women’s rights to their 
bodies makes early abortions more easily permissible. 
It’s useful here to compare animal and fetal rights. It’s easy to 
respect animals’ rights: just don’t shoot them to hang their heads 
on the wall, don’t electrocute them to turn them into fur coats, 
don’t infect them with diseases, don’t kill them to eat them. 
Animals’ rights, mainly, are negative rights: basically, just leave 
them alone. Fetuses’ rights, in contrast, would be positive rights: 
rights to various benefits and forms of assistance from the women 
they are inside of. A pregnant woman surely does not just “leave 
the fetus alone” over the course of pregnancy and childbirth, so to 
speak: she has to put in a lot of physical and emotional effort and 
energy, to say the least. And a pregnant woman might not be 
willing, for many reasons, to provide those benefits to a fetus, 
given all that’s involved. If Thompson is correct, the fetus has no 
right to these benefits, even if they are necessary for his or her life 
to continue, and the pregnant woman has a right to not provide 
them: until there are artificial wombs to transplant unwanted 
fetuses into, a woman has a moral right to an abortion. 
These considerations about rights provide further reason to think 
that early abortions are morally permissible, beyond the inability of 
the above arguments to show that early abortions are wrong. It 
also provides another reason to think that later abortions, even of 
conscious and feeling fetuses, could be morally permissible. But 
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we need to be cautious here: again, even if you need my kidney to 
stay alive, I have a right to my kidney. If, however, somehow you 
need my kidney to avoid being brutally tortured to death, I may be 
morally obligated to give you my kidney, whether you have a right 
to it or not (and maybe you would?!). And so if any later abortions 
are like that, for feeling fetuses, concern for their pain and 
suffering – if it is present – might trump a woman’s rights here. 
The best response about this concern seems to be to ensure that 
this conflict of rights doesn’t arise, by ensuring that any abortions 
happen early in pregnancy, before fetuses are conscious and can 
feel pain. And it might prompt developing methods to ensure that 
any later abortions are painless. 
In sum, animal rights principles don’t condemn early abortions 
and they don’t necessarily condemn later abortions either. The 
perspectives and rights of the pregnant woman make the issues 
complex in ways that we never see with animal rights issues: in 
thinking about animal farming and slaughter, or experimentation, 
we confront animals as individuals. When they are in pairs or 
groups, such as mother and offspring, there never is a conflict of 
rights or ideal outcomes: what’s best for one is always best for all. 
Abortion is not like that, by design. 
6. Anti-Animal Rights and Pro-Life? 
To ensure that our discussion is complete, we shouldn’t forget that 
there are animal rights advocates and animal rights critics. Do any 
of the critics’ arguments have any implications for abortion? 
Yes. Some arguments emphasize that animals don’t contribute 
to (human) culture, lack intellectual accomplishments and 
don’t comprehend the idea of rights, and these concerns seem 
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applicable to human fetuses also. But since they also apply to 
many children and adults also, these are poor objections to animal 
rights. 
A more challenging argument against animal rights that claims that 
that animals lack rights because they are not human and/or 
because they are not the “kind” of being that’s a rational moral 
agent. These arguments’ advocates don’t seem to notice that these 
arguments seem to imply that fetuses have rights, insofar as they 
are human and the kind of being that’s a rational moral agent. So, 
to avoid animal rights, some people embrace an argument that 
seems to have “pro-life” implications, which they don’t realize. 
Most people don’t think that to consistently avoid thinking that 
animals have rights, they must think that abortion is wrong. And 
they need not. That this objection to animal rights has this result 
shows that it is not a good objection to animal rights. (This 
argument is developed in my “Tom Regan on ‘Kind’ Arguments 
against Animal Rights and for Human Rights” in The Moral Rights 
of Animals). 
There may be other connections, but I will leave it to critics of 
animal rights to see what other implications their arguments might 
have for abortion. 
7. Pro-Choice and Animal Rights? 
Finally, do any of the reasons given to be pro-choice imply 
anything positive for animals? 
There are many types of reasons to think that abortion is not 
wrong and many of them have no implications for animals: for 
examples, arguments that abortion is not wrong because fetuses 
are not human beings or not conscious or that they are not 
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persons have no implications for animals. Arguing that early 
fetuses lack the right to life because they don’t have any desires 
for the future won’t clearly apply to animals since they have some 
present desires that drift into the future. So some pro-choice 
arguments don’t have any implications for animals. 
Arguments for abortion based on women’s rights, discussed 
above, suggest profound implications for animals, however. These 
arguments recognize that pregnancy, childbirth and 
parenthood are unique and profound experiences for nearly all 
women who experience them. Even when wanted, these are 
physically and emotionally challenging, life-altering events. And 
these aren’t just things that happen, passively, to a woman: she is 
actively engaged in making them; she is part of them and they 
become her and she will never be the same. 
Female animals who are mothers very likely have some similar 
experiences and feelings. There are obviously very important 
differences in the experiences of human and non-human mothers, 
but the simple and clear point is this: animal mothers love their babies. 
Cows used in dairy production (female, obviously) clearly grieve 
when their calves are forcibly taken from them so that they don’t 
drink their own mother’s milk, biologically meant for them: this is 
kidnapping and theft, so human beings can drink that calves’ milk. 
And a “mother hen” is not just some made up phrase: she cares 
for her chicks, and they care for her. Animals change when they 
have babies. 
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Pro-choice thinkers emphasize that it should be a 
woman’s choice to have maternal experiences, that whether she 
has these experiences should be under her control. This control 
includes the choice to not have these experiences (at least at this 
time, in this situation) and so abortion should be allowed, they 
argue. This impulse for reproductive and maternal control should, 
arguably, extend to female animals used in, for examples, the dairy 
and egg industries and some animal research. Female animals used 
in industries are typically forcibly impregnated. Dairy cows lose 
their calves and will fight to keep them. Hens don’t get to nest 
with their eggs; they don’t get to see their eggs hatch; they don’t 
get to watch over their chicks. Some scientific research disrupts 
mother and offspring relations: remember Harlow’s monkeys? 
Female animals and their offspring endure many unique and 
specific harms in virtue of being female. Their reproduction and 
maternal experience is controlled by human choices which result 
in bad experiences and outcomes for animal mothers and their 
offspring. A certain type of feminist thinking about abortion 
should lead to an animal rights-like view, initially about certain 
harms to female animals. Fairness and empathy should then lead 
to concerns for any conscious and feeling animals, female or male: 
that is, unless there is some relevant difference here that would 
justify discrimination against female animals which, of course, 
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there isn’t. And one hopes that people opposed 
to discrimination against women and girls would be opposed 
to unfair discrimination wherever it is found, whether its victims 
are human or non-human, female or male, mother or child. 
8.  Conclusion 
In sum, we have discussed two controversial issues: abortion and 
animal rights. Not all issues are controversial though: it is 
uncontroversial that it is prima facie wrong to kill human beings. If 
asked why this is so, however, many would quickly respond, 
“Because they are human!” But this answer takes us back to 
controversies, since (biologically) human fetuses are human and it’s 
debatable whether it’s wrong to kill them, and non-human animals 
are clearly not human and it’s debatable whether it is wrong to kill 
them also. ‘Human’ then, seems to not be much of a moral 
explanation. 
Here we have explored some potentially deeper explanations 
about each topic, some more sophisticated arguments, trying to 
see if any reasons given in favor of views on one topic clearly 
extend to the other topic. Generally, with a few exceptions, they 
don’t. That means that one’s views about one topic generally 
needn’t be determined by one’s views about the other. Even when 
some connections or implications are suggested, there are ways to 
avoid these suggestions, given the differences between the issues. 
Whether all those ways of resisting a suggested implication of 
one’s moral principles are rational or intellectually responsible, we 
would have to see. By developing our skills at doing just that 
would surely improve our skills at theorizing and arguing about 
both animal rights and abortion and continuing to try to discern 
what to think about these issues individually, in relation to each 
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other and, potentially, in relation to other pressing ethical and 
social issues.[3] 
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BONUS ESSAY 2: ON “ANIMAL TESTING”
1
 
 
Animal Testing Should Be Banned 
 
“Animal testing” involves experimenting on animals to try to 
determine whether drugs and medical treatments are safe and 
effective for humans. It’s wrong and should be banned. 
 
Why? First, and most obviously, drugs and medical procedures 
treat diseases, injuries, and other health problems. So, to see if a 
treatment works, a disease or injury must be created in animals. 
Understatement: this is often unpleasant. Heart attacks in dogs feel 
awful; bone cancers in mice are painful; pigs being burned, to test 
burn treatments, is agonizing. Animals living with the induced 
conditions is unpleasant also. And they are killed at the end of the 
experiments to study the treatments’ effects. 
 
It’s now easy to see why animal testing is wrong: it violates basic 
principles of ethical research: it is maleficent, or harmful to the 
research subjects; it is not beneficial to them; it is forced on them 
since they don’t consent; and it is unjust in that animals are 
burdened with problems not their own. Research – at least with 
animals who are conscious, and so are able to be harmed or 
made worse off – is wrong for reasons that comparable human 
research would be wrong. 
 
Some argue that the benefits to humans justify animal testing. But 
when one group benefits at the major expense of another group, 
that’s usually wrong. And how exactly might anyone know that 
humans benefit more than animals are harmed? And there is 
scientific evidence that animal testing often is not beneficial for 
humans and that clinical research, public health research, and 
                                               
 
1 Originally published 10/27/16 at 
https://wallethub.com/blog/should-animal-testing-be-
banned/28116/#nathan-nobis  
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technology-based research are more useful: see the Physicians 
Committee for Responsible Medicine and Americans for Medical 
Advancement for more information.   
 
Some claim there are “no alternatives” to animal testing, that it is 
“necessary.” But there are alternatives (mentioned above) and it’s 
not literally necessary that anyone do it: they can refrain. But 
suppose someone wanted to rob a bank and needed a getaway car: 
there is “no alternative” to a car and so it is “necessary” for the 
robbery. Does that make using the car OK? No. Even if 
something is “necessary” and there are “no alternatives” to doing 
it to achieve a particular end, that doesn’t make doing the action right: 
the end determines that.   
 
Finally, some say that this reasoning is all beside the point: if your 
child was dying and animal testing would save him or her, 
wouldn’t you want the testing done? Many would and that’s an 
understandable feeling. But it’s unlikely that animal 
experimentation would help their child much: other methods are 
likely more fruitful. And more importantly, if my child were dying 
and I tried to experiment on my neighbor’s children to try to save 
my own child, that would be wrong. 
 
Why? Simply because those children would be harmed and treated 
as mere things to be used (and abused) for my and my child’s 
benefit, which they are not. Since those reasons apply to many 
animals experimented upon, animal testing is also wrong. 
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